Loading…

Resilient Cooperative Secondary Control of Islanded AC Microgrids Utilizing Inverter-Based Resources Against State-Dependent False Data Injection Attacks

This paper investigates the impact of potential state-dependent false data injection cyber-attacks on frequency synchronization and active power management in islanded ac microgrids. One potential way of affecting microgrid reliability is by forcing a generation outage. Thus, the attacker could pote...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:IEEE transactions on industrial electronics (1982) 2024-05, Vol.71 (5), p.1-12
Main Authors: Jamali, Mahmood, Sadabadi, Mahdieh S., Davari, Masoud, Sahoo, Subham, Blaabjerg, Frede
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
cited_by cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c2438-c92d32598e702ebd3457f96c20f07473b8f75776feac0c373f0d06e381df8f5b3
cites cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c2438-c92d32598e702ebd3457f96c20f07473b8f75776feac0c373f0d06e381df8f5b3
container_end_page 12
container_issue 5
container_start_page 1
container_title IEEE transactions on industrial electronics (1982)
container_volume 71
creator Jamali, Mahmood
Sadabadi, Mahdieh S.
Davari, Masoud
Sahoo, Subham
Blaabjerg, Frede
description This paper investigates the impact of potential state-dependent false data injection cyber-attacks on frequency synchronization and active power management in islanded ac microgrids. One potential way of affecting microgrid reliability is by forcing a generation outage. Thus, the attacker could potentially aim to desynchronize inverter-based resources in microgrids by manipulating their frequency with malicious injections. The attack signals are injected to manipulate control input channels, sensor nodes, reference values, and the information exchanged through communication networks. In order to mitigate the adverse impacts of such cyber-attacks, firstly, the conventional distributed consensus-based secondary control approach is modified and complemented in the presence of cyber-attacks. Secondly, a resilient cooperative distributed secondary control scheme is proposed by utilizing the concept of a virtual layer interconnected with the main network layer. Thirdly, theoretical stability, resilience analysis, and design considerations of interconnection matrices are also provided. Finally, simulations through MATLAB/Simulink and experimental results are presented in order to illustrate the robust performance of the proposed control scheme.
doi_str_mv 10.1109/TIE.2023.3281698
format article
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2904681632</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><ieee_id>10146307</ieee_id><sourcerecordid>2904681632</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c2438-c92d32598e702ebd3457f96c20f07473b8f75776feac0c373f0d06e381df8f5b3</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNpNUbtOAzEQtBBIhEdPQWGJ-sLavjv7yhBekUBIPOqT41tHDsEOtkGCP-FvcRQKqpV2Z2Z3Zwg5YTBmDLrz59nVmAMXY8EVazu1Q0asaWTVdbXaJSPgUlUAdbtPDlJaArC6Yc2I_DxiciuHPtNpCGuMOrtPpE9ogh90_Cpdn2NY0WDpLK20H3Cgkym9dyaGRXRDoi-5CHw7v6Az_4kxY6wudCqwIh0-osFEJwvtfMr0KeuM1SWuseiUldd6lZBe6qwLd4kmu-DpJGdtXtMR2bOb8fFfPSQv11fP09vq7uFmNp3cVYbXQlWm44PgTadQAsf5IOpG2q41HCzIWoq5srKRsrWoDRghhYUBWhSKDVbZZi4OydlWdx3D-wem3C_L1b6s7HlXDCtuCl5QsEWVt1OKaPt1dG_FoJ5BvwmgLwH0mwD6vwAK5XRLcYj4D87qVoAUv_ohg5g</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>2904681632</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Resilient Cooperative Secondary Control of Islanded AC Microgrids Utilizing Inverter-Based Resources Against State-Dependent False Data Injection Attacks</title><source>IEEE Xplore (Online service)</source><creator>Jamali, Mahmood ; Sadabadi, Mahdieh S. ; Davari, Masoud ; Sahoo, Subham ; Blaabjerg, Frede</creator><creatorcontrib>Jamali, Mahmood ; Sadabadi, Mahdieh S. ; Davari, Masoud ; Sahoo, Subham ; Blaabjerg, Frede</creatorcontrib><description>This paper investigates the impact of potential state-dependent false data injection cyber-attacks on frequency synchronization and active power management in islanded ac microgrids. One potential way of affecting microgrid reliability is by forcing a generation outage. Thus, the attacker could potentially aim to desynchronize inverter-based resources in microgrids by manipulating their frequency with malicious injections. The attack signals are injected to manipulate control input channels, sensor nodes, reference values, and the information exchanged through communication networks. In order to mitigate the adverse impacts of such cyber-attacks, firstly, the conventional distributed consensus-based secondary control approach is modified and complemented in the presence of cyber-attacks. Secondly, a resilient cooperative distributed secondary control scheme is proposed by utilizing the concept of a virtual layer interconnected with the main network layer. Thirdly, theoretical stability, resilience analysis, and design considerations of interconnection matrices are also provided. Finally, simulations through MATLAB/Simulink and experimental results are presented in order to illustrate the robust performance of the proposed control scheme.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0278-0046</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1557-9948</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1109/TIE.2023.3281698</identifier><identifier>CODEN: ITIED6</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>New York: IEEE</publisher><subject>Communication networks ; Cooperative control ; Cyberattack ; Cybersecurity ; Distributed generation ; False data injection (FDI) ; Frequency control ; Frequency synchronization ; Heuristic algorithms ; inverter-based resources (IBRs) ; Inverters ; islanded ac microgrids ; Microgrids ; Power management ; Resilience ; resilient active power-sharing ; resilient cooperative control ; resilient frequency synchronization ; Stability analysis ; state-dependent FDI cyber-attacks ; Synchronization</subject><ispartof>IEEE transactions on industrial electronics (1982), 2024-05, Vol.71 (5), p.1-12</ispartof><rights>Copyright The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE) 2024</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c2438-c92d32598e702ebd3457f96c20f07473b8f75776feac0c373f0d06e381df8f5b3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c2438-c92d32598e702ebd3457f96c20f07473b8f75776feac0c373f0d06e381df8f5b3</cites><orcidid>0000-0003-3586-8435 ; 0000-0002-7916-028X ; 0000-0002-4609-9152 ; 0000-0001-5153-9485 ; 0000-0001-8311-7412</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10146307$$EHTML$$P50$$Gieee$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,27924,27925,54796</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Jamali, Mahmood</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Sadabadi, Mahdieh S.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Davari, Masoud</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Sahoo, Subham</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Blaabjerg, Frede</creatorcontrib><title>Resilient Cooperative Secondary Control of Islanded AC Microgrids Utilizing Inverter-Based Resources Against State-Dependent False Data Injection Attacks</title><title>IEEE transactions on industrial electronics (1982)</title><addtitle>TIE</addtitle><description>This paper investigates the impact of potential state-dependent false data injection cyber-attacks on frequency synchronization and active power management in islanded ac microgrids. One potential way of affecting microgrid reliability is by forcing a generation outage. Thus, the attacker could potentially aim to desynchronize inverter-based resources in microgrids by manipulating their frequency with malicious injections. The attack signals are injected to manipulate control input channels, sensor nodes, reference values, and the information exchanged through communication networks. In order to mitigate the adverse impacts of such cyber-attacks, firstly, the conventional distributed consensus-based secondary control approach is modified and complemented in the presence of cyber-attacks. Secondly, a resilient cooperative distributed secondary control scheme is proposed by utilizing the concept of a virtual layer interconnected with the main network layer. Thirdly, theoretical stability, resilience analysis, and design considerations of interconnection matrices are also provided. Finally, simulations through MATLAB/Simulink and experimental results are presented in order to illustrate the robust performance of the proposed control scheme.</description><subject>Communication networks</subject><subject>Cooperative control</subject><subject>Cyberattack</subject><subject>Cybersecurity</subject><subject>Distributed generation</subject><subject>False data injection (FDI)</subject><subject>Frequency control</subject><subject>Frequency synchronization</subject><subject>Heuristic algorithms</subject><subject>inverter-based resources (IBRs)</subject><subject>Inverters</subject><subject>islanded ac microgrids</subject><subject>Microgrids</subject><subject>Power management</subject><subject>Resilience</subject><subject>resilient active power-sharing</subject><subject>resilient cooperative control</subject><subject>resilient frequency synchronization</subject><subject>Stability analysis</subject><subject>state-dependent FDI cyber-attacks</subject><subject>Synchronization</subject><issn>0278-0046</issn><issn>1557-9948</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2024</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNpNUbtOAzEQtBBIhEdPQWGJ-sLavjv7yhBekUBIPOqT41tHDsEOtkGCP-FvcRQKqpV2Z2Z3Zwg5YTBmDLrz59nVmAMXY8EVazu1Q0asaWTVdbXaJSPgUlUAdbtPDlJaArC6Yc2I_DxiciuHPtNpCGuMOrtPpE9ogh90_Cpdn2NY0WDpLK20H3Cgkym9dyaGRXRDoi-5CHw7v6Az_4kxY6wudCqwIh0-osFEJwvtfMr0KeuM1SWuseiUldd6lZBe6qwLd4kmu-DpJGdtXtMR2bOb8fFfPSQv11fP09vq7uFmNp3cVYbXQlWm44PgTadQAsf5IOpG2q41HCzIWoq5srKRsrWoDRghhYUBWhSKDVbZZi4OydlWdx3D-wem3C_L1b6s7HlXDCtuCl5QsEWVt1OKaPt1dG_FoJ5BvwmgLwH0mwD6vwAK5XRLcYj4D87qVoAUv_ohg5g</recordid><startdate>20240501</startdate><enddate>20240501</enddate><creator>Jamali, Mahmood</creator><creator>Sadabadi, Mahdieh S.</creator><creator>Davari, Masoud</creator><creator>Sahoo, Subham</creator><creator>Blaabjerg, Frede</creator><general>IEEE</general><general>The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)</general><scope>97E</scope><scope>RIA</scope><scope>RIE</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7SP</scope><scope>8FD</scope><scope>L7M</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3586-8435</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7916-028X</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4609-9152</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5153-9485</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8311-7412</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>20240501</creationdate><title>Resilient Cooperative Secondary Control of Islanded AC Microgrids Utilizing Inverter-Based Resources Against State-Dependent False Data Injection Attacks</title><author>Jamali, Mahmood ; Sadabadi, Mahdieh S. ; Davari, Masoud ; Sahoo, Subham ; Blaabjerg, Frede</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c2438-c92d32598e702ebd3457f96c20f07473b8f75776feac0c373f0d06e381df8f5b3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2024</creationdate><topic>Communication networks</topic><topic>Cooperative control</topic><topic>Cyberattack</topic><topic>Cybersecurity</topic><topic>Distributed generation</topic><topic>False data injection (FDI)</topic><topic>Frequency control</topic><topic>Frequency synchronization</topic><topic>Heuristic algorithms</topic><topic>inverter-based resources (IBRs)</topic><topic>Inverters</topic><topic>islanded ac microgrids</topic><topic>Microgrids</topic><topic>Power management</topic><topic>Resilience</topic><topic>resilient active power-sharing</topic><topic>resilient cooperative control</topic><topic>resilient frequency synchronization</topic><topic>Stability analysis</topic><topic>state-dependent FDI cyber-attacks</topic><topic>Synchronization</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Jamali, Mahmood</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Sadabadi, Mahdieh S.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Davari, Masoud</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Sahoo, Subham</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Blaabjerg, Frede</creatorcontrib><collection>IEEE All-Society Periodicals Package (ASPP) 2005–Present</collection><collection>IEEE All-Society Periodicals Package (ASPP) 1998–Present</collection><collection>IEEE Xplore (Online service)</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Electronics &amp; Communications Abstracts</collection><collection>Technology Research Database</collection><collection>Advanced Technologies Database with Aerospace</collection><jtitle>IEEE transactions on industrial electronics (1982)</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Jamali, Mahmood</au><au>Sadabadi, Mahdieh S.</au><au>Davari, Masoud</au><au>Sahoo, Subham</au><au>Blaabjerg, Frede</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Resilient Cooperative Secondary Control of Islanded AC Microgrids Utilizing Inverter-Based Resources Against State-Dependent False Data Injection Attacks</atitle><jtitle>IEEE transactions on industrial electronics (1982)</jtitle><stitle>TIE</stitle><date>2024-05-01</date><risdate>2024</risdate><volume>71</volume><issue>5</issue><spage>1</spage><epage>12</epage><pages>1-12</pages><issn>0278-0046</issn><eissn>1557-9948</eissn><coden>ITIED6</coden><abstract>This paper investigates the impact of potential state-dependent false data injection cyber-attacks on frequency synchronization and active power management in islanded ac microgrids. One potential way of affecting microgrid reliability is by forcing a generation outage. Thus, the attacker could potentially aim to desynchronize inverter-based resources in microgrids by manipulating their frequency with malicious injections. The attack signals are injected to manipulate control input channels, sensor nodes, reference values, and the information exchanged through communication networks. In order to mitigate the adverse impacts of such cyber-attacks, firstly, the conventional distributed consensus-based secondary control approach is modified and complemented in the presence of cyber-attacks. Secondly, a resilient cooperative distributed secondary control scheme is proposed by utilizing the concept of a virtual layer interconnected with the main network layer. Thirdly, theoretical stability, resilience analysis, and design considerations of interconnection matrices are also provided. Finally, simulations through MATLAB/Simulink and experimental results are presented in order to illustrate the robust performance of the proposed control scheme.</abstract><cop>New York</cop><pub>IEEE</pub><doi>10.1109/TIE.2023.3281698</doi><tpages>12</tpages><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3586-8435</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7916-028X</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4609-9152</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5153-9485</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8311-7412</orcidid></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext
identifier ISSN: 0278-0046
ispartof IEEE transactions on industrial electronics (1982), 2024-05, Vol.71 (5), p.1-12
issn 0278-0046
1557-9948
language eng
recordid cdi_proquest_journals_2904681632
source IEEE Xplore (Online service)
subjects Communication networks
Cooperative control
Cyberattack
Cybersecurity
Distributed generation
False data injection (FDI)
Frequency control
Frequency synchronization
Heuristic algorithms
inverter-based resources (IBRs)
Inverters
islanded ac microgrids
Microgrids
Power management
Resilience
resilient active power-sharing
resilient cooperative control
resilient frequency synchronization
Stability analysis
state-dependent FDI cyber-attacks
Synchronization
title Resilient Cooperative Secondary Control of Islanded AC Microgrids Utilizing Inverter-Based Resources Against State-Dependent False Data Injection Attacks
url http://sfxeu10.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/loughborough?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-12-28T03%3A52%3A45IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Resilient%20Cooperative%20Secondary%20Control%20of%20Islanded%20AC%20Microgrids%20Utilizing%20Inverter-Based%20Resources%20Against%20State-Dependent%20False%20Data%20Injection%20Attacks&rft.jtitle=IEEE%20transactions%20on%20industrial%20electronics%20(1982)&rft.au=Jamali,%20Mahmood&rft.date=2024-05-01&rft.volume=71&rft.issue=5&rft.spage=1&rft.epage=12&rft.pages=1-12&rft.issn=0278-0046&rft.eissn=1557-9948&rft.coden=ITIED6&rft_id=info:doi/10.1109/TIE.2023.3281698&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E2904681632%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Cgrp_id%3Ecdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c2438-c92d32598e702ebd3457f96c20f07473b8f75776feac0c373f0d06e381df8f5b3%3C/grp_id%3E%3Coa%3E%3C/oa%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=2904681632&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_ieee_id=10146307&rfr_iscdi=true