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Information Complementarities and the Dynamics of Transparency Shock Spillovers
ABSTRACT We show that information complementarities play an important role in the spillover of transparency shocks. We exploit the revelation of financial misconduct by S&P 500 firms, and in a “Stacked Difference‐in‐Differences” design, find that the implied cost of capital increases for “close”...
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Published in: | Journal of accounting research 2024-03, Vol.62 (1), p.55-99 |
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creator | BANERJEE, SHANTANU DASGUPTA, SUDIPTO SHI, RUI YAN, JIALI |
description | ABSTRACT
We show that information complementarities play an important role in the spillover of transparency shocks. We exploit the revelation of financial misconduct by S&P 500 firms, and in a “Stacked Difference‐in‐Differences” design, find that the implied cost of capital increases for “close” industry peers of the fraudulent firms relative to “distant” industry peers. The spillover effect is particularly strong when the close peers and the fraudulent firm share common analyst coverage and common institutional ownership, which have been shown to be powerful proxies for fundamental linkages and information complementarities. We provide evidence that increase in the cost of capital of peer firms is due, at least in part, to “beta shocks.” Disclosure by close peers—especially those with co‐coverage and co‐ownership links—also increases following fraud revelation. Although disclosure remains high in the following years, the cost of equity starts to decrease. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1111/1475-679X.12510 |
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We show that information complementarities play an important role in the spillover of transparency shocks. We exploit the revelation of financial misconduct by S&P 500 firms, and in a “Stacked Difference‐in‐Differences” design, find that the implied cost of capital increases for “close” industry peers of the fraudulent firms relative to “distant” industry peers. The spillover effect is particularly strong when the close peers and the fraudulent firm share common analyst coverage and common institutional ownership, which have been shown to be powerful proxies for fundamental linkages and information complementarities. We provide evidence that increase in the cost of capital of peer firms is due, at least in part, to “beta shocks.” Disclosure by close peers—especially those with co‐coverage and co‐ownership links—also increases following fraud revelation. Although disclosure remains high in the following years, the cost of equity starts to decrease.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0021-8456</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1475-679X</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12510</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Chicago: Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher><subject>Capital ; Companies ; Cost of capital ; cost of equity ; disclosure ; Fraud ; information complementarity ; information environment ; Misconduct ; Ownership ; Peers ; Professional misconduct ; Transparency</subject><ispartof>Journal of accounting research, 2024-03, Vol.62 (1), p.55-99</ispartof><rights>2023 The Authors. published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of The Chookaszian Accounting Research Center at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business.</rights><rights>2023. This article is published under http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (the “License”). Notwithstanding the ProQuest Terms and Conditions, you may use this content in accordance with the terms of the License.</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c4470-620c78fadda1569a2507901ea72e5660828af2cec90a2e01b20e1c69b89b20f63</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c4470-620c78fadda1569a2507901ea72e5660828af2cec90a2e01b20e1c69b89b20f63</cites><orcidid>0000-0002-0346-7285 ; 0009-0001-4176-3237 ; 0000-0001-5116-4548 ; 0000-0002-5247-748X</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,27924,27925,33223</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>BANERJEE, SHANTANU</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>DASGUPTA, SUDIPTO</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>SHI, RUI</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>YAN, JIALI</creatorcontrib><title>Information Complementarities and the Dynamics of Transparency Shock Spillovers</title><title>Journal of accounting research</title><description>ABSTRACT
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We show that information complementarities play an important role in the spillover of transparency shocks. We exploit the revelation of financial misconduct by S&P 500 firms, and in a “Stacked Difference‐in‐Differences” design, find that the implied cost of capital increases for “close” industry peers of the fraudulent firms relative to “distant” industry peers. The spillover effect is particularly strong when the close peers and the fraudulent firm share common analyst coverage and common institutional ownership, which have been shown to be powerful proxies for fundamental linkages and information complementarities. We provide evidence that increase in the cost of capital of peer firms is due, at least in part, to “beta shocks.” Disclosure by close peers—especially those with co‐coverage and co‐ownership links—also increases following fraud revelation. Although disclosure remains high in the following years, the cost of equity starts to decrease.</abstract><cop>Chicago</cop><pub>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</pub><doi>10.1111/1475-679X.12510</doi><tpages>45</tpages><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0346-7285</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0009-0001-4176-3237</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5116-4548</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5247-748X</orcidid><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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source | International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); Business Source Ultimate; Wiley-Blackwell Read & Publish Collection |
subjects | Capital Companies Cost of capital cost of equity disclosure Fraud information complementarity information environment Misconduct Ownership Peers Professional misconduct Transparency |
title | Information Complementarities and the Dynamics of Transparency Shock Spillovers |
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