Political and non-political side activities in an agency framework

This paper studies side activities, including political activities, in the context of a hidden action agency problem. Given increases in the number of employees working from home and increases in managerial political engagement, such activities have become more prevalent. We examine the impact of th...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Economics of governance 2024-03, Vol.25 (1), p.111-137
Main Author: Marino, Anthony M.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Brand loyalty
Cash flow
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
Employees
Equilibrium
Feedback
International Political Economy
Original Paper
Political activism
Political participation
Political Theory
Public Administration
Public Finance
Work at home
Citations: Items that this one cites
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Summary:This paper studies side activities, including political activities, in the context of a hidden action agency problem. Given increases in the number of employees working from home and increases in managerial political engagement, such activities have become more prevalent. We examine the impact of these activities on the optimal contact, the agent’s welfare, the firm’s profit, and total welfare. For the case of political activities, we study the impact of external negative and positive feedback as the result of these activities on the optimal contract and all equilibrium variables. We ask whether the firm should encourage or discourage these activities.
ISSN:1435-6104
1435-8131
DOI:10.1007/s10101-023-00307-3