Loading…
The Fiscal Logic of Responsiveness: Public Finance, Elections, and Public Goods Provision in Rural China
Governmental fiscal transfers can be important tools for redistributing resources and enhancing public services in areas with limited local resources. Meanwhile, politicians can use fiscal transfers to build patronage networks, weaken opposition candidates, or engage in rent-seeking. An understudied...
Saved in:
Published in: | Studies in comparative international development 2024-03, Vol.59 (1), p.1-26 |
---|---|
Main Author: | |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Citations: | Items that this one cites |
Online Access: | Get full text |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
Summary: | Governmental fiscal transfers can be important tools for redistributing resources and enhancing public services in areas with limited local resources. Meanwhile, politicians can use fiscal transfers to build patronage networks, weaken opposition candidates, or engage in rent-seeking. An understudied feature of governmental transfers is that local governments can become fiscally dependent on higher-level government. This dependence might lead local officials to favor the priorities of higher-level government while compromising responsiveness to local residents. Using panel data from Chinese villages, I demonstrate that when villages become more dependent on fiscal transfers from townships, they provide fewer public goods to villagers, pay more wages to village elites, and have stronger incentives to enforce the policies favored by higher-level governments. The results also suggest that fiscal transfers will not undermine local representation when electoral competition for village leadership positions exists. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 0039-3606 1936-6167 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s12116-023-09383-2 |