Love and evaluative conflict

Lovers often disagree. We may reject the specific goals our loved ones pursue or the broad values they hold. Some philosophers suggest that such evaluative conflict makes romantic love in its ideal form deficient. I argue that this is mistaken. On the contrary, our ideal of love holds that we can lo...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:European journal of philosophy 2024-03, Vol.32 (1), p.145-158
Main Author: Tillman, Jeremiah
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Conflict
Independence
Love
Philosophers
Political parties
Radicalism
Religion
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Summary:Lovers often disagree. We may reject the specific goals our loved ones pursue or the broad values they hold. Some philosophers suggest that such evaluative conflict makes romantic love in its ideal form deficient. I argue that this is mistaken. On the contrary, our ideal of love holds that we can love people for “who they are” (as we say), even as we profoundly disagree with them. My argument draws on intuitive cases from screwball comedy about love amid conflict, love across political party lines, as well as “forbidden” love across religions and cultures. At a deeper level, I sketch an ideal of love I call intimate independence and argue that this ideal is (a) fully compatible with any evaluative conflict, (b) embedded in our ordinary attitudes toward mature love between equals, and (c) an ideal worth achieving. As long as intimate independence is a compelling ideal, deep conflict will not seem like an obstacle to true love. The ideal reminds us that love can bring together people with radically different points of view, and that to insist on shared ends or values is thus to miss a part of the meaning and power of love.
ISSN:0966-8373
1468-0378
DOI:10.1111/ejop.12832