Temporal ontology and joint action

• Published in: Inquiry (Oslo) 2024-04, Vol.67 (4), p.1170-1192
• Main Author: Crowther, Thomas
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Behavior; Collective action; events; Friendship; Human agency; joint action; Life; Ontology; Philosophy; processes; shared intention; Social interaction; states; Temporal ontology; Time
• ISSN: 0020-174X; 1502-3923
• DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2020.1731592

The aim of the paper is to describe the temporal ontology of that basic manifestation of social agency that is the living of life together. The distinction between states, processes and events is clarified. There are notions of 'doing things together' that fall into each of these temporal categories. The ontology of the state of friendship is examined as one instance of living life together. Friendship is a state of community between agents that is sustained by a continuity of processes and events that are characteristic manifestations of the state, some (but not all) of which are processes of doing things together. The continuity of processes and events involved in friendship is distinctive in lacking a telic point. Further instances of shared life that possess this characteristic temporal structure are described. It is argued that this notion of a mode of shared life cannot be recovered from various kinds of temporally extended agential structures that are the ingredients of Michael Bratman's work on shared agency. In so doing, I clarify the notion of a shared life and make a case for the fruitfulness of approaching questions about joint action from the perspective of work on the ontology of time occupation.