Collusion under product differentiation

The present model analyses the possibility of stable cartels under vertical and horizontal product differentiation in the presence of cost asymmetry. This possibility is lesser for an agreement that allows the lower quality product to be produced when the quality difference (net of cost) increases o...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of economics (Vienna, Austria) Austria), 2024-06, Vol.142 (1), p.1-43
Main Authors: Sen, Neelanjan, Tandon, Urvashi, Biswas, Rajit
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Agreements
Breweries
Cartels
Collusion
Differentiation
Economic analysis
Economic models
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
Game Theory
Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics
Microeconomics
Payments
Product differentiation
Public Finance
Social and Behav. Sciences
Welfare
Citations: Items that this one cites
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
cited_by
cites cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c360t-577c78eab33374ab8427048866d2b55dda0794924a72ac78ba628c52730620c23
container_end_page 43
container_issue 1
container_start_page 1
container_title Journal of economics (Vienna, Austria)
container_volume 142
creator Sen, Neelanjan
Tandon, Urvashi
Biswas, Rajit
description The present model analyses the possibility of stable cartels under vertical and horizontal product differentiation in the presence of cost asymmetry. This possibility is lesser for an agreement that allows the lower quality product to be produced when the quality difference (net of cost) increases or the level of horizontal product differentiation decreases. However, if side payments are allowed, and the cartel agreement does not allow the lower quality product to be produced, the result changes. In this second situation, the possibility of a stable cartel falls if the quality difference (net of cost) falls or the horizontal product differentiation increases. Welfare may increase after cartel formation if the lower quality good is not produced in the presence of side payments.
doi_str_mv 10.1007/s00712-023-00852-9
format article
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_journals_3030959055</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>3030959055</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c360t-577c78eab33374ab8427048866d2b55dda0794924a72ac78ba628c52730620c23</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNp9kE1LxDAQhoMoWFf_gKeCB0_RyXdylKKrsOBFzyFNUulS2zVpD_57oxW8eZk5zPPODA9ClwRuCIC6zaUQioEyDKAFxeYIVUQShRVh_BhVYBjBWgp9is5y3gMAl1JV6LqZhmHJ_TTWyxhiqg9pCouf69B3XUxxnHs3l-k5OunckOPFb9-g14f7l-YR7563T83dDnsmYcZCKa90dC1jTHHXak4VcK2lDLQVIgQHynBDuVPUFbJ1kmovqGIgKXjKNuhq3Vv--Fhinu1-WtJYTloGDIwwIESh6Er5NOWcYmcPqX936dMSsN9C7CrEFiH2R4g1JcTWUC7w-BbT3-p_Ul94AmEN</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>3030959055</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Collusion under product differentiation</title><source>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</source><source>Springer Nature</source><creator>Sen, Neelanjan ; Tandon, Urvashi ; Biswas, Rajit</creator><creatorcontrib>Sen, Neelanjan ; Tandon, Urvashi ; Biswas, Rajit</creatorcontrib><description>The present model analyses the possibility of stable cartels under vertical and horizontal product differentiation in the presence of cost asymmetry. This possibility is lesser for an agreement that allows the lower quality product to be produced when the quality difference (net of cost) increases or the level of horizontal product differentiation decreases. However, if side payments are allowed, and the cartel agreement does not allow the lower quality product to be produced, the result changes. In this second situation, the possibility of a stable cartel falls if the quality difference (net of cost) falls or the horizontal product differentiation increases. Welfare may increase after cartel formation if the lower quality good is not produced in the presence of side payments.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0931-8658</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1617-7134</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1007/s00712-023-00852-9</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Vienna: Springer Vienna</publisher><subject>Agreements ; Breweries ; Cartels ; Collusion ; Differentiation ; Economic analysis ; Economic models ; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods ; Economics ; Economics and Finance ; Game Theory ; Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics ; Microeconomics ; Payments ; Product differentiation ; Public Finance ; Social and Behav. Sciences ; Welfare</subject><ispartof>Journal of economics (Vienna, Austria), 2024-06, Vol.142 (1), p.1-43</ispartof><rights>The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH Austria, part of Springer Nature 2024. Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c360t-577c78eab33374ab8427048866d2b55dda0794924a72ac78ba628c52730620c23</cites><orcidid>0000-0001-5947-5965</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,27924,27925,33223</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Sen, Neelanjan</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Tandon, Urvashi</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Biswas, Rajit</creatorcontrib><title>Collusion under product differentiation</title><title>Journal of economics (Vienna, Austria)</title><addtitle>J Econ</addtitle><description>The present model analyses the possibility of stable cartels under vertical and horizontal product differentiation in the presence of cost asymmetry. This possibility is lesser for an agreement that allows the lower quality product to be produced when the quality difference (net of cost) increases or the level of horizontal product differentiation decreases. However, if side payments are allowed, and the cartel agreement does not allow the lower quality product to be produced, the result changes. In this second situation, the possibility of a stable cartel falls if the quality difference (net of cost) falls or the horizontal product differentiation increases. Welfare may increase after cartel formation if the lower quality good is not produced in the presence of side payments.</description><subject>Agreements</subject><subject>Breweries</subject><subject>Cartels</subject><subject>Collusion</subject><subject>Differentiation</subject><subject>Economic analysis</subject><subject>Economic models</subject><subject>Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods</subject><subject>Economics</subject><subject>Economics and Finance</subject><subject>Game Theory</subject><subject>Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics</subject><subject>Microeconomics</subject><subject>Payments</subject><subject>Product differentiation</subject><subject>Public Finance</subject><subject>Social and Behav. Sciences</subject><subject>Welfare</subject><issn>0931-8658</issn><issn>1617-7134</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2024</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>8BJ</sourceid><recordid>eNp9kE1LxDAQhoMoWFf_gKeCB0_RyXdylKKrsOBFzyFNUulS2zVpD_57oxW8eZk5zPPODA9ClwRuCIC6zaUQioEyDKAFxeYIVUQShRVh_BhVYBjBWgp9is5y3gMAl1JV6LqZhmHJ_TTWyxhiqg9pCouf69B3XUxxnHs3l-k5OunckOPFb9-g14f7l-YR7563T83dDnsmYcZCKa90dC1jTHHXak4VcK2lDLQVIgQHynBDuVPUFbJ1kmovqGIgKXjKNuhq3Vv--Fhinu1-WtJYTloGDIwwIESh6Er5NOWcYmcPqX936dMSsN9C7CrEFiH2R4g1JcTWUC7w-BbT3-p_Ul94AmEN</recordid><startdate>20240601</startdate><enddate>20240601</enddate><creator>Sen, Neelanjan</creator><creator>Tandon, Urvashi</creator><creator>Biswas, Rajit</creator><general>Springer Vienna</general><general>Springer Nature B.V</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5947-5965</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>20240601</creationdate><title>Collusion under product differentiation</title><author>Sen, Neelanjan ; Tandon, Urvashi ; Biswas, Rajit</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c360t-577c78eab33374ab8427048866d2b55dda0794924a72ac78ba628c52730620c23</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2024</creationdate><topic>Agreements</topic><topic>Breweries</topic><topic>Cartels</topic><topic>Collusion</topic><topic>Differentiation</topic><topic>Economic analysis</topic><topic>Economic models</topic><topic>Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods</topic><topic>Economics</topic><topic>Economics and Finance</topic><topic>Game Theory</topic><topic>Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics</topic><topic>Microeconomics</topic><topic>Payments</topic><topic>Product differentiation</topic><topic>Public Finance</topic><topic>Social and Behav. Sciences</topic><topic>Welfare</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Sen, Neelanjan</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Tandon, Urvashi</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Biswas, Rajit</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Journal of economics (Vienna, Austria)</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Sen, Neelanjan</au><au>Tandon, Urvashi</au><au>Biswas, Rajit</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Collusion under product differentiation</atitle><jtitle>Journal of economics (Vienna, Austria)</jtitle><stitle>J Econ</stitle><date>2024-06-01</date><risdate>2024</risdate><volume>142</volume><issue>1</issue><spage>1</spage><epage>43</epage><pages>1-43</pages><issn>0931-8658</issn><eissn>1617-7134</eissn><abstract>The present model analyses the possibility of stable cartels under vertical and horizontal product differentiation in the presence of cost asymmetry. This possibility is lesser for an agreement that allows the lower quality product to be produced when the quality difference (net of cost) increases or the level of horizontal product differentiation decreases. However, if side payments are allowed, and the cartel agreement does not allow the lower quality product to be produced, the result changes. In this second situation, the possibility of a stable cartel falls if the quality difference (net of cost) falls or the horizontal product differentiation increases. Welfare may increase after cartel formation if the lower quality good is not produced in the presence of side payments.</abstract><cop>Vienna</cop><pub>Springer Vienna</pub><doi>10.1007/s00712-023-00852-9</doi><tpages>43</tpages><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5947-5965</orcidid></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext
identifier ISSN: 0931-8658
ispartof Journal of economics (Vienna, Austria), 2024-06, Vol.142 (1), p.1-43
issn 0931-8658
1617-7134
language eng
recordid cdi_proquest_journals_3030959055
source International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); Springer Nature
subjects Agreements
Breweries
Cartels
Collusion
Differentiation
Economic analysis
Economic models
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
Game Theory
Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics
Microeconomics
Payments
Product differentiation
Public Finance
Social and Behav. Sciences
Welfare
title Collusion under product differentiation
url http://sfxeu10.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/loughborough?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-12-30T23%3A18%3A08IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Collusion%20under%20product%20differentiation&rft.jtitle=Journal%20of%20economics%20(Vienna,%20Austria)&rft.au=Sen,%20Neelanjan&rft.date=2024-06-01&rft.volume=142&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=1&rft.epage=43&rft.pages=1-43&rft.issn=0931-8658&rft.eissn=1617-7134&rft_id=info:doi/10.1007/s00712-023-00852-9&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E3030959055%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Cgrp_id%3Ecdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c360t-577c78eab33374ab8427048866d2b55dda0794924a72ac78ba628c52730620c23%3C/grp_id%3E%3Coa%3E%3C/oa%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=3030959055&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true