Banklash: How Media Coverage of Bank Scandals Moves Mass Preferences on Financial Regulation

Financial regulation is often adopted in the wake of scandals and crises. Yet political science has little to say about the political effects of corporate scandals. We break that silence, asking whether exposure to news coverage of bank scandals changes the preferences of voters for financial regula...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:American journal of political science 2024-04, Vol.68 (2), p.427-444
Main Authors: Culpepper, Pepper D., Jung, Jae‐Hee, Lee, Taeku
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Experiments
Mass media
Media coverage
Panel data
Political economy
Political science
Polls & surveys
Public finance
Public opinion
Regulation of financial institutions
Scandals
Voters
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Summary:Financial regulation is often adopted in the wake of scandals and crises. Yet political science has little to say about the political effects of corporate scandals. We break that silence, asking whether exposure to news coverage of bank scandals changes the preferences of voters for financial regulation. Drawing from the literatures on media influence and public opinion, we argue that news coverage of bank scandals should increase voters’ appetite for regulation. We test our hypothesis with data from six countries, using original nationally representative panel surveys with embedded experiments (total N = 27,673). Our pooled and country‐specific analyses largely support our expectation that exposure to news coverage of scandals increases regulatory preferences. We reproduce this finding in a separate survey wave, using different scandals than in our original analysis. These results contribute to studies on media influence on public opinion, the political significance of scandals, and the political economy of regulation.
ISSN:0092-5853
1540-5907
DOI:10.1111/ajps.12752