Assertion, Lying and the Norm of Truth

In chapter four of Truth and Truthfulness Bernard Williams presents an account of assertion that relies heavily on the ‘psychological’ notions of belief and intention. In chapter five his definition of lying similarly relies on such notions. For Williams, insofar as there are norms governing asserti...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Topoi 2024-05, Vol.43 (2), p.459-467
Main Author: Teichmann, Roger
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Credibility
Education
Linguistics
Norms
Philosophy
Philosophy of Science
Philosophy of Technology
Citations: Items that this one cites
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Summary:In chapter four of Truth and Truthfulness Bernard Williams presents an account of assertion that relies heavily on the ‘psychological’ notions of belief and intention. In chapter five his definition of lying similarly relies on such notions. For Williams, insofar as there are norms governing assertion as such or norms broken by lying as such, these norms relate to saying what you think to be true, as distinct from saying what is true. I argue that this ‘psychologized’ account of assertion (and lying) is for various reasons mistaken. A consequence of Williams’s approach is that ‘Shall I tell the truth here?’ is presented as a much more open question for an agent than it possibly can be. Only by adverting to the language-game presupposed by that question’s having any sense at all can we arrive at a fair picture of when and how the answer ‘No’ might be reasonable.
ISSN:0167-7411
1572-8749
DOI:10.1007/s11245-023-09956-9