Political uncertainty and litigation efficiency: Evidence from China

In this article, we investigate the influence of local official turnover on litigation efficiency using manually collected data from listed companies in China from 1995 to 2013. Our findings indicate that official turnover leads to a decrease in litigation efficiency, with a 16.3% increase in the du...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Economics and politics 2024-07, Vol.36 (2), p.1020-1055
Main Authors: Huang, Yuexin, Li, Ruijing, Luo, Danglun, Yuan, Rongli
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Efficiency
Enforcement
itigation efficiency
judicial fairness
judicial independence
Litigation
litigation cyclel
official turnover
political uncertainty
Private enterprise
Uncertainty
Citations: Items that this one cites
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:In this article, we investigate the influence of local official turnover on litigation efficiency using manually collected data from listed companies in China from 1995 to 2013. Our findings indicate that official turnover leads to a decrease in litigation efficiency, with a 16.3% increase in the duration of litigation cases. This effect is more pronounced when newly appointed officials are working in different locations. It is more significant when the involved enterprise is a private entity, suggesting that political cycles contribute to the selective enforcement of private enterprises. Further analysis reveals that the adverse impact of official turnover on litigation efficiency is short‐lived. The conclusions contribute to the existing literature on official turnover and litigation efficiency and hold potential implications for judicial independence reforms.
ISSN:0954-1985
1468-0343
DOI:10.1111/ecpo.12276