A Treatment of EIP-1559: Enhancing Transaction Fee Mechanism through Nth-Price Auction

With the widespread adoption of blockchain technology, the transaction fee mechanism (TFM) in blockchain systems has become a prominent research topic. An ideal TFM should satisfy user incentive compatibility (UIC), miner incentive compatibility (MIC), and miner-user side contract proofness (\(c\)-S...

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Published in:arXiv.org 2024-06
Main Authors: Li, Kun, Qi, Guangpeng, Shang, Guangyong, Deng, Wanli, Xu, Minghui, Cheng, Xiuzhen
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Blockchain
Compatibility
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Summary:With the widespread adoption of blockchain technology, the transaction fee mechanism (TFM) in blockchain systems has become a prominent research topic. An ideal TFM should satisfy user incentive compatibility (UIC), miner incentive compatibility (MIC), and miner-user side contract proofness (\(c\)-SCP). However, state-of-the-art works either fail to meet these three properties simultaneously or only satisfy them under certain conditions. In this paper, we propose a burning \(N\)-price auction TFM named BNP. This mechanism divides the transaction fee into a base fee, which is burned, and a priority fee, which is allocated to miners. Theoretical proofs and experimental analyses demonstrate that, even under conditions of significant transaction congestion, this mechanism satisfies UIC, MIC, and \(c\)-SCP simultaneously. Furthermore, the BNP mechanism is not constrained by the type of blockchain consensus, making it widely applicable.
ISSN:2331-8422