In defense of humean non-universal laws

In this paper, I raise a novel objection to David Lewis’s Humean account of laws. The objection is that non-universal laws are metaphysically possible, but Lewis’s account cannot accommodate them. I then propose and defend an extension of Lewis’s view that gives us an account of Humean non-universal...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Synthese (Dordrecht) 2024-07, Vol.204 (1), p.26, Article 26
Main Author: Gupte, Firdaus
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Education
Epistemology
Law
Lewis, David
Logic
Metaphysics
Original Research
Philosophy
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Science
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Summary:In this paper, I raise a novel objection to David Lewis’s Humean account of laws. The objection is that non-universal laws are metaphysically possible, but Lewis’s account cannot accommodate them. I then propose and defend an extension of Lewis’s view that gives us an account of Humean non-universal laws.
ISSN:1573-0964
0039-7857
1573-0964
DOI:10.1007/s11229-024-04678-w