Some Conspiracy Theories

A remarkable feature of the philosophical work on conspiracy theory theory has been that most philosophers agree there is nothing inherently problematic about conspiracy theories (AKA the thesis of particularism). Recent work, however, has challenged this consensus view, arguing that there really is...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Social epistemology 2023-07, Vol.37 (4), p.522-534
Main Author: Dentith, M R. X.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
consensus
Conspiracy
Conspiracy theory
generalism
Particularism
Philosophers
Theory
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Summary:A remarkable feature of the philosophical work on conspiracy theory theory has been that most philosophers agree there is nothing inherently problematic about conspiracy theories (AKA the thesis of particularism). Recent work, however, has challenged this consensus view, arguing that there really is something epistemically wrong with conspiracy theorising (AKA generalism). Are particularism and generalism incompatible? By looking at just how much particularists and generalists might have to give away to make their theoretical viewpoints compatible, I will argue that particularists can accept many of the concerns that motivate generalism because generalism can never be about 'all' conspiracy theories without being either ahistorical or apolitical. In the end generalist critiques are best seen as useful guidelines or considerations for the appraising of particular conspiracy theories.
ISSN:0269-1728
1464-5297
DOI:10.1080/02691728.2023.2173539