Why Practical Wisdom Cannot be Eliminated

Practical wisdom eliminativism has recently been proposed in both philosophy and psychology, on the grounds of the alleged redundancy of practical wisdom (Miller 2021 ) and its purported developmental/psychological implausibility (Lapsley 2021 ). Here we respond to these challenges by drawing on an...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Topoi 2024-08, Vol.43 (3), p.895-910
Main Authors: De Caro, Mario, Navarini, Claudia, Vaccarezza, Maria Silvia
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Collaboration
Education
Ethics
Philosophers
Philosophy
Philosophy of Science
Philosophy of Technology
Psychologists
Psychology
Realism
Science
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Summary:Practical wisdom eliminativism has recently been proposed in both philosophy and psychology, on the grounds of the alleged redundancy of practical wisdom (Miller 2021 ) and its purported developmental/psychological implausibility (Lapsley 2021 ). Here we respond to these challenges by drawing on an improved version of a view of practical wisdom, the “Aretai model”, that we have presented elsewhere (De Caro et al. 2021 ; Vaccarezza et al. 2023 ; De Caro et al. forthcoming ). According to this model, practical wisdom is conceptualized: (i) as virtuousness tout court , i.e., as the ratio essendi of the virtues, and (ii) as a form of ethical expertise. By appealing to the first thesis, we counter the charge of psychological implausibility, while we rely on the second thesis to address the accusation of redundancy. In conclusion we argue that the Aretai model implies a significant paradigm shift in virtue ethics. Practical wisdom emerges as both necessary and sufficient for virtuousness, thereby downsizing – without eliminating entirely – the role that individual virtues play in our ethical lives.
ISSN:0167-7411
1572-8749
DOI:10.1007/s11245-024-10030-1