Too cool for school: Participatory shirking and U.S. House passage of proxy voting

• Published in: The American journal of economics and sociology 2024-09, Vol.83 (4), p.793-807
• Main Authors: Mixon, Franklin G., Torgler, Benno
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: COVID-19; Leadership; Legislatures; Pandemics; Protection; Protective factors; Voters; Voting
• ISSN: 0002-9246; 1536-7150
• DOI: 10.1111/ajes.12594

A large portion of the American electorate holds contempt for elected representatives who skip floor votes. As a result, political challengers, and the national political media in the U.S., rarely miss a chance to inform the electorate of the shirking behavior of its representatives. New research suggests that, in 2020, the leadership of the U.S. House of Representatives may have developed protection, albeit temporary, to legislators who engage in shirking behavior. That protection came via passage of House Resolution 965, which authorized “remote voting by proxy” in the U.S. House of Representatives due to the COVID‐19 pandemic. This study extends the literature on proxy voting by empirically examining the factors that influenced the tendency of members of the U.S. House of Representatives to either shirk (i.e., skip) the vote on proxy voting (i.e., HR 965) or to vote in favor of the resolution (i.e., HR 965) allowing for the proxy vote. Econometric results suggest that Representatives' gender, age, legislative tenure, and past penchant for participatory shirking worked to determine parliamentary participation, and the direction of one's vote, on HR 965.