RAZOR‐THIN MASS ELECTIONS WITH HIGH TURNOUT

We argue that traditional voting models fail to fully explain the frequency of very close mass elections with high turnout. Instead, we model elections as a competition between incentive schemes to mobilize voters. We elucidate conditions under which parties might prefer close elections, as the pote...

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Published in:International economic review (Philadelphia) 2024-11, Vol.65 (4), p.1607-1624
Main Authors: Levine, David K., Martinelli, Cesar
Format: Article
Language:English
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Elections
Incentives
Voter behavior
Voter turnout
Voters
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Martinelli, Cesar
description We argue that traditional voting models fail to fully explain the frequency of very close mass elections with high turnout. Instead, we model elections as a competition between incentive schemes to mobilize voters. We elucidate conditions under which parties might prefer close elections, as the potential to be pivotal motivates voters instead of exclusively costly incentives as in nonclose elections. We show that, under those conditions, better voter targeting results in tighter races and increased turnout. Furthermore, the smaller party often has a strong incentive to commit to strategies that ensure a close election.
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source International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); Wiley; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts
subjects Elections
Incentives
Voter behavior
Voter turnout
Voters
title RAZOR‐THIN MASS ELECTIONS WITH HIGH TURNOUT
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