Strategic Resources for Drug Trafficking Organizations and the Geography of Violence: Evidence from Mexico

This article helps understand why locations close to strategic infrastructure to transport illegal drugs (seaports, airports, highways, and US ports of entry along the Mexico-US border) or to increase income (pipelines) experience different levels of violence due to DTOs operations. Our theory break...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Latin American politics and society 2024-11, Vol.66 (4), p.92-112
Main Authors: Macías-Medellín, Martín, Ponce, Aldo F.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Airports
Borders
Competition
Competitors
Conflict
Drug abuse
Drug trafficking
Drugs
Geography
Human trafficking
Infrastructure
Monopolies
Pipelines
Ports
Proximity
Substance abuse
Violence
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Summary:This article helps understand why locations close to strategic infrastructure to transport illegal drugs (seaports, airports, highways, and US ports of entry along the Mexico-US border) or to increase income (pipelines) experience different levels of violence due to DTOs operations. Our theory breaks down the impact of the geographical distance to these facilities on violence into two effects. The first effect is produced by the level of (violent) competition among DTOs, measured by the number of DTOs employing violence. We report that greater proximity to the U.S. ports of entry along the Mexico-US border, ports, and airports furthers the number of competitors, and such increase boosts violence. The second effect shapes the intensity of competition among DTOs. Reductions in the costs of excluding competing DTOs from using the facility could trigger greater confrontation among DTOs. We confirm the importance of this second effect in relation to ports and the U.S. ports of entry along the Mexico-US border.
ISSN:1531-426X
1548-2456
DOI:10.1017/lap.2024.11