REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTIONS: Commonsense Justice and Standard of Proof

In a criminal trial, the standard of proof is successfully met when the prosecution presents facts that convince the jury "beyond a reasonable doubt." Recent research suggests that most definitions of beyond reasonable doubt that have passed constitutional muster elicit subjective standard...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Psychology, public policy, and law public policy, and law, 1997-06, Vol.3 (2-3), p.285-302
Main Author: Horowitz, Irwin A
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Human
Juries
Justice
Legal Processes
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Summary:In a criminal trial, the standard of proof is successfully met when the prosecution presents facts that convince the jury "beyond a reasonable doubt." Recent research suggests that most definitions of beyond reasonable doubt that have passed constitutional muster elicit subjective standards of certainty of guilt that are lower than previously observed. These results intimate that citizens may have altered the balance between due process and crime control values and may be willing to convict on a lesser showing than due process requires. This article discusses the possibility that, rather than the well-established "leniency bias" (acquittal bias) in criminal trials, juries may now exhibit a conviction bias in certain types of trials.
ISSN:1076-8971
1939-1528
DOI:10.1037/1076-8971.3.2-3.285