“Just-so” stories about “inner cognitive Africa”: some doubts about Sorensen's evolutionary epistemology of thought experiments

Roy Sorensen advances an evolutionary explanation of our capacity for thought experiments which doubles as a naturalized epistemological justification. I argue Sorensen"s explanation fails to satisfy key elements of environmental-selectionist explanations and so fails to carry epistemic force....

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Biology & philosophy 1997-04, Vol.12 (2), p.207-224
Main Author: Maffie, James
Format: Article
Language:English
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Summary:Roy Sorensen advances an evolutionary explanation of our capacity for thought experiments which doubles as a naturalized epistemological justification. I argue Sorensen"s explanation fails to satisfy key elements of environmental-selectionist explanations and so fails to carry epistemic force. I then argue that even if Sorensen succeeds in showing the adaptive utility of our capacity, he still fails to establish its reliability and hence epistemic utility. I conclude Sorensen"s account comes to little more than a "just-so story".[PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
ISSN:0169-3867
1572-8404
DOI:10.1023/A:1017986908266