Diverging Opinions

People often see the same evidence but draw opposite conclusions, becoming polarized over time. More surprisingly, disagreements persist even when they are commonly known. We derive a model and present an experiment showing that opinions can diverge when onedimensional opinions are formed from two-d...

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Published in:American economic journal. Microeconomics 2012-02, Vol.4 (1), p.209-232
Main Authors: Andreoni, James, Mylovanov, Tymofiy
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Absolute value
Agreements
Betting
Decision making
Dictators
Economic models
Economic statistics
Economic theory
Expected values
Experiments
Microeconomics
Opinions
Public information
Rational choice theory
Rationality
State of nature
Statistical significance
Studies
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container_title American economic journal. Microeconomics
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description People often see the same evidence but draw opposite conclusions, becoming polarized over time. More surprisingly, disagreements persist even when they are commonly known. We derive a model and present an experiment showing that opinions can diverge when onedimensional opinions are formed from two-dimensional information.When subjects are given sufficient information to reach agreement, however, disagreement persists. Subjects discount information when it is filtered through the actions of others, but not when it is presented directly, indicating that common knowledge of disagreement may be the result of excessive skepticism about the decision-making skills of others.
doi_str_mv 10.1257/mic.4.1.209
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identifier ISSN: 1945-7669
ispartof American economic journal. Microeconomics, 2012-02, Vol.4 (1), p.209-232
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source EBSCOhost Econlit with Full Text; JSTOR Archival Journals and Primary Sources Collection; ABI/INFORM Global; American Economic Association
subjects Absolute value
Agreements
Betting
Decision making
Dictators
Economic models
Economic statistics
Economic theory
Expected values
Experiments
Microeconomics
Opinions
Public information
Rational choice theory
Rationality
State of nature
Statistical significance
Studies
title Diverging Opinions
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