A note on the efficiency and fairness of decentralized matching

This note shows by means of simulation experiments that although two-sided matching markets can always converge to a stable outcome via a decentralized process of matching and rematching, the most likely outcome need not be the median matching or a minimum-choice-count matching, whether or not the t...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Operations research letters 2011-07, Vol.39 (4), p.231-233
Main Author: Boudreau, James W.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Applied sciences
Decentralized
Decentralized matching
Efficiency
Exact sciences and technology
Fairness
Flows in networks. Combinatorial problems
Markets
Matching
Operational research and scientific management
Operational research. Management science
Operations research
Simulation
Tâtonnement
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Summary:This note shows by means of simulation experiments that although two-sided matching markets can always converge to a stable outcome via a decentralized process of matching and rematching, the most likely outcome need not be the median matching or a minimum-choice-count matching, whether or not the two coincide.
ISSN:0167-6377
1872-7468
DOI:10.1016/j.orl.2011.04.010