Two-person ex post implementation

This paper investigates the ex post implementation of a social choice set with two agents. A social choice set F is ex post implementable with two agents if F satisfies the conditions of ex post incentive compatibility (EPIC) and ex post monotonicity (EM) in an environment that is economic and has a...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Games and economic behavior 2012-05, Vol.75 (1), p.435-440
Main Author: Ohashi, Yoshihiro
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Decision theory
Economic theory
Equilibrium theory
Ex post equilibrium
Game theory
Implementation
Preferences
Public choice
Studies
Two-person
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Summary:This paper investigates the ex post implementation of a social choice set with two agents. A social choice set F is ex post implementable with two agents if F satisfies the conditions of ex post incentive compatibility (EPIC) and ex post monotonicity (EM) in an environment that is economic and has a bad outcome. Furthermore, if F is a social choice function, (EPIC), (EM), and an economic environment are sufficient.
ISSN:0899-8256
1090-2473
DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2011.09.006