Agent Performance, Incentives, and Ownership

Real estate agents are paid in two ways. One way is from a split percentage of the individual’s generated revenue. The other is from an ownership share of the firm’s profit from all agents. Tests are performed on whether having ownership increases individual agent performance as measured by the numb...

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Published in:Journal of housing research 2012-01, Vol.21 (1), p.101-122
Main Authors: Chinloy, Peter, Winkler, Daniel T.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Agency
Business structures
Earnings
Employee ownership
Employees
Employment
Executive compensation
Incentives
Limited liability companies
Limited partnerships
Natural logarithms
Ownership
Ownership incentives
Productivity
Profit sharing plans
Profits
Property ownership
Proprietorships
Real estate
Real estate agencies
Real estate agents
Real estate agents & brokers
Real estate market
Sales
Statistical significance
Stock splits
Stockholders
Studies
Transaction costs
U.S.A
Wages & salaries
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container_title Journal of housing research
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description Real estate agents are paid in two ways. One way is from a split percentage of the individual’s generated revenue. The other is from an ownership share of the firm’s profit from all agents. Tests are performed on whether having ownership increases individual agent performance as measured by the number of transactions, average transaction size, gross sales, and income. For agents in the United States in 2007, ownership raises the volume of transactions among partners and stock holders. Ownership increases gross sales and income by partners but not necessarily among stock holders.
doi_str_mv 10.1080/10835547.2012.12092053
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source International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); ABI/INFORM Collection; JSTOR Archival Journals and Primary Sources Collection; Politics Collection; Social Science Premium Collection (Proquest) (PQ_SDU_P3); Taylor and Francis Social Sciences and Humanities Collection
subjects Agency
Business structures
Earnings
Employee ownership
Employees
Employment
Executive compensation
Incentives
Limited liability companies
Limited partnerships
Natural logarithms
Ownership
Ownership incentives
Productivity
Profit sharing plans
Profits
Property ownership
Proprietorships
Real estate
Real estate agencies
Real estate agents
Real estate agents & brokers
Real estate market
Sales
Statistical significance
Stock splits
Stockholders
Studies
Transaction costs
U.S.A
Wages & salaries
title Agent Performance, Incentives, and Ownership
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