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The Role of Central Bank Transparency for Guiding Private Sector Forecasts
Central banks have become remarkably more transparent over the last few decades. In this paper, we study the effects of this evolution, focusing on whether enhanced central bank transparency lowers dispersion among professional forecasters of key economic variables. We use a large set of proxies for...
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| Published in: | The Scandinavian journal of economics 2012-09, Vol.114 (3), p.1018-1052 |
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| Main Authors: | , , |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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| cited_by | cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c5496-f2f80651ada042baacb1efe17fe81ef8eaba3db052e55c0632a5d227b39989153 |
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| cites | cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c5496-f2f80651ada042baacb1efe17fe81ef8eaba3db052e55c0632a5d227b39989153 |
| container_end_page | 1052 |
| container_issue | 3 |
| container_start_page | 1018 |
| container_title | The Scandinavian journal of economics |
| container_volume | 114 |
| creator | Ehrmann, Michael Eijffinger, Sylvester Fratzscher, Marcel |
| description | Central banks have become remarkably more transparent over the last few decades. In this paper, we study the effects of this evolution, focusing on whether enhanced central bank transparency lowers dispersion among professional forecasters of key economic variables. We use a large set of proxies for central-bank transparency in 12 advanced economies. We find evidence for a sizeable effect (e.g., by announcing a quantified inflation objective, or by publishing inflation and output forecasts). However, there are decreasing marginal effects to increases in transparency, and the disagreement among the expectations of the general public is not affected. This suggests that there are possible limits to transparency. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2012.01706.x |
| format | article |
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| identifier | ISSN: 0347-0520 |
| ispartof | The Scandinavian journal of economics, 2012-09, Vol.114 (3), p.1018-1052 |
| issn | 0347-0520 1467-9442 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1074676548 |
| source | EconLit s plnými texty; International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); Business Source Ultimate【Trial: -2024/12/31】【Remote access available】; Wiley; JSTOR Archival Journals |
| subjects | Analytical forecasting Bank operations C53 Central bank communication Central banks disagreement Disclosure E37 E52 Economic expectations Economic forecasting Economic forecasting models Economic forecasts Economic indicators Economic indices Effects Forecasting models Inflation inflation targeting Macroeconomics monetary policy Private sector Statistical forecasts Studies survey expectations Transparency |
| title | The Role of Central Bank Transparency for Guiding Private Sector Forecasts |
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