A test of the auditor reliability framework using lenders’ judgments

• Published in: Accounting, organizations and society organizations and society, 2012-11, Vol.37 (8), p.519-533
• Main Authors: DeZoort, F. Todd, Holt, Travis, Taylor, Mark H.
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Accountant independence; Accounting; Auditing; Auditors; Commercial credit; Empirical research; Financial reporting; Judgement; Nonaudit services; Objectivity; Professional ethics; Reliability; Studies
• ISSN: 0361-3682; 1873-6289
• DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2012.08.003

Taylor et al. (2003) challenged the longstanding notion that independence is the capstone of the audit profession by proposing a conceptual framework that emphasizes reliability, rather than independence, as the professional endgame for auditors. Although the reliability framework has attracted attention from policymakers, it has not been tested empirically in an audit context to assess its validity from a user’s perspective. The objective of this study is to test the auditor reliability framework and its formative ethical constructs (i.e., integrity, expertise, independence, objectivity, and reliability) with a sample of 168 commercial lenders. We also extend the reliability framework to examine the extent that perceived auditor reliability affects lenders’ judgments of financial reporting reliability and default risk in a hypothetical lending scenario. Finally, we evaluate the extent that lenders’ judgments are affected by auditor provision of nonaudit bookkeeping and payroll services to a prospective borrower in violation of current independence rules. The results provide strong empirical support for the relations predicted in the reliability framework. Structural equation model results indicate that auditor integrity is the foundation of the framework, directly affecting lenders’ assessments of auditor expertise, independence, objectivity, and reliability. Further, although integrity and objectivity directly affect perceived auditor reliability, independence and expertise only affects reliability indirectly through its impact on objectivity. Finally, we find that lenders perceive no decrease in auditor objectivity or reliability when existing independence rules are violated by combining audit services with nonaudit services for prospective borrowers.