THE UNEMPLOYMENT VOLATILITY PUZZLE: THE ROLE OF MATCHING COSTS REVISITED

Pissarides has argued that the standard search model with sunk fixed matching costs increases unemployment volatility without introducing an unrealistic response of wages of new matches to productivity shocks. We revise the role of matching costs and show that when these costs are not sunk and, ther...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Economic inquiry 2013-01, Vol.51 (1), p.836-843
Main Authors: SILVA, JOSÉ I., TOLEDO, MANUEL
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Analysis
Cost analysis
Economic aspects
Economic shock
Economic theory
Empirical tests
Productivity
Studies
Unemployment
Unemployment benefits
Unemployment insurance
Volatility
Wages
Wages & salaries
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Summary:Pissarides has argued that the standard search model with sunk fixed matching costs increases unemployment volatility without introducing an unrealistic response of wages of new matches to productivity shocks. We revise the role of matching costs and show that when these costs are not sunk and, therefore, can be partially passed on to new hired workers in the form of lower wages, the amplification mechanism of fixed matching costs is considerably reduced. Finally, we observe that an empirical reasonable share of sunk costs is not able to match the volatility of unemployment without introducing unrealistic sensitivity to unemployment benefits. (JEL E32, J32, J64)
ISSN:0095-2583
1465-7295
DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2011.00407.x