Formal Analysis of Multilateral Negotiations Over the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea

The Evolutionary Model for Multilateral Negotiations (EMMN) is utilized to identify the most likely outcome of the Caspian Sea negotiations. Since 1993, the five littoral states have been negotiating over the legal status of the Caspian Sea but have not reached any agreement, causing a Tragedy of th...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Group decision and negotiation 2012-05, Vol.21 (3), p.305-329
Main Authors: Sheikhmohammady, Majid, Hipel, Keith W., Kilgour, D. Marc
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Agreements
Analysis
Biological and Physical Anthropology
Business and Management
Caspian Sea
Conflict
Conflict resolution
Evolutionary Model for Multilateral Negotiations
Forecasts
Group decision making
Legal status
Legitimacy
Methodology
Multilateral relations
Multilateralism
Negotiation
Negotiations
Power
Preferences
Statistical analysis
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Summary:The Evolutionary Model for Multilateral Negotiations (EMMN) is utilized to identify the most likely outcome of the Caspian Sea negotiations. Since 1993, the five littoral states have been negotiating over the legal status of the Caspian Sea but have not reached any agreement, causing a Tragedy of the Commons to unfold. EMMN is a methodology that focuses on asymmetric multilateral negotiations, like those over the Caspian Sea, in which each negotiator seeks to reach the most preferable outcome for which he or she can gain enough support from other negotiators. An advantage of the EMMN approach is that it considers the power of the negotiators as a determining factor in the final resolution. The results of this analysis are compared with those of other studies on Caspian Sea conflict where the powers of decision makers are not taken into account.
ISSN:0926-2644
1572-9907
DOI:10.1007/s10726-010-9195-5