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Formal Analysis of Multilateral Negotiations Over the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea

The Evolutionary Model for Multilateral Negotiations (EMMN) is utilized to identify the most likely outcome of the Caspian Sea negotiations. Since 1993, the five littoral states have been negotiating over the legal status of the Caspian Sea but have not reached any agreement, causing a Tragedy of th...

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Published in:Group decision and negotiation 2012-05, Vol.21 (3), p.305-329
Main Authors: Sheikhmohammady, Majid, Hipel, Keith W., Kilgour, D. Marc
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description The Evolutionary Model for Multilateral Negotiations (EMMN) is utilized to identify the most likely outcome of the Caspian Sea negotiations. Since 1993, the five littoral states have been negotiating over the legal status of the Caspian Sea but have not reached any agreement, causing a Tragedy of the Commons to unfold. EMMN is a methodology that focuses on asymmetric multilateral negotiations, like those over the Caspian Sea, in which each negotiator seeks to reach the most preferable outcome for which he or she can gain enough support from other negotiators. An advantage of the EMMN approach is that it considers the power of the negotiators as a determining factor in the final resolution. The results of this analysis are compared with those of other studies on Caspian Sea conflict where the powers of decision makers are not taken into account.
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source International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); Business Source Ultimate; ABI/INFORM Global; Springer Nature:Jisc Collections:Springer Nature Read and Publish 2023-2025: Springer Reading List; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts
subjects Agreements
Analysis
Biological and Physical Anthropology
Business and Management
Caspian Sea
Conflict
Conflict resolution
Evolutionary Model for Multilateral Negotiations
Forecasts
Group decision making
Legal status
Legitimacy
Methodology
Multilateral relations
Multilateralism
Negotiation
Negotiations
Power
Preferences
Statistical analysis
title Formal Analysis of Multilateral Negotiations Over the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea
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