Loading…
The Effects of Succession Choice Surrounding CEO Turnover Announcements: Evidence from Marathon Successions
This study examines marathon successions, which I define as top executive searches that are extended past the formal departure notice of the incumbent chief executive officer (CEO). Marathons should be used when search costs are high and when little time passes from when the incumbent steps down to...
Saved in:
| Published in: | Financial management 2013-03, Vol.42 (1), p.211-238 |
|---|---|
| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Subjects: | |
| Citations: | Items that this one cites Items that cite this one |
| Online Access: | Get full text |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| cited_by | cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c6965-ba82ead9aea065e47d3a25fff54002bf6fa5c4daf9896d8f8e0d18bae329128c3 |
|---|---|
| cites | cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c6965-ba82ead9aea065e47d3a25fff54002bf6fa5c4daf9896d8f8e0d18bae329128c3 |
| container_end_page | 238 |
| container_issue | 1 |
| container_start_page | 211 |
| container_title | Financial management |
| container_volume | 42 |
| creator | Intintoli, Vincent J. |
| description | This study examines marathon successions, which I define as top executive searches that are extended past the formal departure notice of the incumbent chief executive officer (CEO). Marathons should be used when search costs are high and when little time passes from when the incumbent steps down to when they leave the firm. Consistent with these predictions, marathons primarily follow surprise departures and forced turnovers. Marathons are also likely for firms operating in heterogeneous industries that face early tenure incumbent departures. These findings shed light on an increasingly prevalent form of succession and provide insight into the rationale and implications behind the announcement. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/j.1755-053X.2012.01215.x |
| format | article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>gale_proqu</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1319612347</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><galeid>A323502205</galeid><jstor_id>43280133</jstor_id><sourcerecordid>A323502205</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c6965-ba82ead9aea065e47d3a25fff54002bf6fa5c4daf9896d8f8e0d18bae329128c3</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNqNkl9v0zAUxSMEEqXwEZAs8cIDCf4TpwkPSFXXjaFuE6Joe7Nc57p119ibnYzu2-NQ1DLUBxJFtq9_58S-OkmCCM5IfD6uMzLiPMWc3WQUE5rFj_Bs-ywZ7DeeJwOM8yJlZUVfJq9CWONIYVoMktv5CtBUa1BtQE6j751SEIJxFk1WziiIFe9dZ2tjl2gyvULzzlv3AB6NrY11BQ3YNnxC0wdTQ1wi7V2DLqSX7Sq6HAzD6-SFlpsAb_6Mw-TH6XQ--ZLOrs7OJ-NZqoqq4OlClhRkXUmQuOCQj2omKdda8xxjutCFllzltdRVWRV1qUvANSkXEhitCC0VGybvd7533t13EFrRmKBgs5EWXBcEYaQqCGX5KKLv_kHXLt4vni5SeVGR-E92oJZyA8JY7VovVW8qxowyjimNbR4m6RFqCRa83DgL2sTyEz47wse3hsaoo4IPfwkWXTC276wNZrlqw1J2ITzFyx2uvAvBgxZ33jTSPwqCRZ8dsRZ9REQfEdFnR_zOjthG6eed9Gc8wuN_68Tp-cW4n0aDtzuDdWid3xvkjJaYMHbolQktbPf70t-KYsRGXFxfnomTy283119PZmLOfgG94-In</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>1346915403</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>The Effects of Succession Choice Surrounding CEO Turnover Announcements: Evidence from Marathon Successions</title><source>EconLit s plnými texty</source><source>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</source><source>Business Source Ultimate【Trial: -2024/12/31】【Remote access available】</source><source>JSTOR Archival Journals and Primary Sources Collection</source><source>Wiley-Blackwell Read & Publish Collection</source><creator>Intintoli, Vincent J.</creator><creatorcontrib>Intintoli, Vincent J.</creatorcontrib><description>This study examines marathon successions, which I define as top executive searches that are extended past the formal departure notice of the incumbent chief executive officer (CEO). Marathons should be used when search costs are high and when little time passes from when the incumbent steps down to when they leave the firm. Consistent with these predictions, marathons primarily follow surprise departures and forced turnovers. Marathons are also likely for firms operating in heterogeneous industries that face early tenure incumbent departures. These findings shed light on an increasingly prevalent form of succession and provide insight into the rationale and implications behind the announcement.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0046-3892</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1755-053X</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1111/j.1755-053X.2012.01215.x</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Melbourne, Australia: Blackwell Publishing Asia</publisher><subject>Analysis ; Appointments, resignations and dismissals ; Business structures ; Capital expenditures ; Chief executive officers ; Corporate governance ; Cost analysis ; Employee turnover ; Enterprises ; Executive dismissals ; Financial management ; Hiring ; Incumbents ; Industry ; Marathons ; Modeling ; Political succession ; Proxy statements ; Studies ; Succession ; Succession planning ; Surprise ; Tenure ; Wall Street</subject><ispartof>Financial management, 2013-03, Vol.42 (1), p.211-238</ispartof><rights>2013 Financial Management Association International</rights><rights>2012 Financial Management Association International.</rights><rights>COPYRIGHT 2013 Financial Management Association</rights><rights>Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Spring 2013</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c6965-ba82ead9aea065e47d3a25fff54002bf6fa5c4daf9896d8f8e0d18bae329128c3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c6965-ba82ead9aea065e47d3a25fff54002bf6fa5c4daf9896d8f8e0d18bae329128c3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/43280133$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/43280133$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,27924,27925,33223,33224,58238,58471</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Intintoli, Vincent J.</creatorcontrib><title>The Effects of Succession Choice Surrounding CEO Turnover Announcements: Evidence from Marathon Successions</title><title>Financial management</title><description>This study examines marathon successions, which I define as top executive searches that are extended past the formal departure notice of the incumbent chief executive officer (CEO). Marathons should be used when search costs are high and when little time passes from when the incumbent steps down to when they leave the firm. Consistent with these predictions, marathons primarily follow surprise departures and forced turnovers. Marathons are also likely for firms operating in heterogeneous industries that face early tenure incumbent departures. These findings shed light on an increasingly prevalent form of succession and provide insight into the rationale and implications behind the announcement.</description><subject>Analysis</subject><subject>Appointments, resignations and dismissals</subject><subject>Business structures</subject><subject>Capital expenditures</subject><subject>Chief executive officers</subject><subject>Corporate governance</subject><subject>Cost analysis</subject><subject>Employee turnover</subject><subject>Enterprises</subject><subject>Executive dismissals</subject><subject>Financial management</subject><subject>Hiring</subject><subject>Incumbents</subject><subject>Industry</subject><subject>Marathons</subject><subject>Modeling</subject><subject>Political succession</subject><subject>Proxy statements</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Succession</subject><subject>Succession planning</subject><subject>Surprise</subject><subject>Tenure</subject><subject>Wall Street</subject><issn>0046-3892</issn><issn>1755-053X</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2013</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>8BJ</sourceid><recordid>eNqNkl9v0zAUxSMEEqXwEZAs8cIDCf4TpwkPSFXXjaFuE6Joe7Nc57p119ibnYzu2-NQ1DLUBxJFtq9_58S-OkmCCM5IfD6uMzLiPMWc3WQUE5rFj_Bs-ywZ7DeeJwOM8yJlZUVfJq9CWONIYVoMktv5CtBUa1BtQE6j751SEIJxFk1WziiIFe9dZ2tjl2gyvULzzlv3AB6NrY11BQ3YNnxC0wdTQ1wi7V2DLqSX7Sq6HAzD6-SFlpsAb_6Mw-TH6XQ--ZLOrs7OJ-NZqoqq4OlClhRkXUmQuOCQj2omKdda8xxjutCFllzltdRVWRV1qUvANSkXEhitCC0VGybvd7533t13EFrRmKBgs5EWXBcEYaQqCGX5KKLv_kHXLt4vni5SeVGR-E92oJZyA8JY7VovVW8qxowyjimNbR4m6RFqCRa83DgL2sTyEz47wse3hsaoo4IPfwkWXTC276wNZrlqw1J2ITzFyx2uvAvBgxZ33jTSPwqCRZ8dsRZ9REQfEdFnR_zOjthG6eed9Gc8wuN_68Tp-cW4n0aDtzuDdWid3xvkjJaYMHbolQktbPf70t-KYsRGXFxfnomTy283119PZmLOfgG94-In</recordid><startdate>20130301</startdate><enddate>20130301</enddate><creator>Intintoli, Vincent J.</creator><general>Blackwell Publishing Asia</general><general>Wiley Subscription Services, Inc</general><general>Financial Management Association</general><general>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</general><scope>BSCLL</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>N95</scope><scope>XI7</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20130301</creationdate><title>The Effects of Succession Choice Surrounding CEO Turnover Announcements: Evidence from Marathon Successions</title><author>Intintoli, Vincent J.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c6965-ba82ead9aea065e47d3a25fff54002bf6fa5c4daf9896d8f8e0d18bae329128c3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2013</creationdate><topic>Analysis</topic><topic>Appointments, resignations and dismissals</topic><topic>Business structures</topic><topic>Capital expenditures</topic><topic>Chief executive officers</topic><topic>Corporate governance</topic><topic>Cost analysis</topic><topic>Employee turnover</topic><topic>Enterprises</topic><topic>Executive dismissals</topic><topic>Financial management</topic><topic>Hiring</topic><topic>Incumbents</topic><topic>Industry</topic><topic>Marathons</topic><topic>Modeling</topic><topic>Political succession</topic><topic>Proxy statements</topic><topic>Studies</topic><topic>Succession</topic><topic>Succession planning</topic><topic>Surprise</topic><topic>Tenure</topic><topic>Wall Street</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Intintoli, Vincent J.</creatorcontrib><collection>Istex</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Gale Business Insights</collection><collection>Business Insights: Essentials</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Financial management</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Intintoli, Vincent J.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>The Effects of Succession Choice Surrounding CEO Turnover Announcements: Evidence from Marathon Successions</atitle><jtitle>Financial management</jtitle><date>2013-03-01</date><risdate>2013</risdate><volume>42</volume><issue>1</issue><spage>211</spage><epage>238</epage><pages>211-238</pages><issn>0046-3892</issn><eissn>1755-053X</eissn><abstract>This study examines marathon successions, which I define as top executive searches that are extended past the formal departure notice of the incumbent chief executive officer (CEO). Marathons should be used when search costs are high and when little time passes from when the incumbent steps down to when they leave the firm. Consistent with these predictions, marathons primarily follow surprise departures and forced turnovers. Marathons are also likely for firms operating in heterogeneous industries that face early tenure incumbent departures. These findings shed light on an increasingly prevalent form of succession and provide insight into the rationale and implications behind the announcement.</abstract><cop>Melbourne, Australia</cop><pub>Blackwell Publishing Asia</pub><doi>10.1111/j.1755-053X.2012.01215.x</doi><tpages>28</tpages></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0046-3892 |
| ispartof | Financial management, 2013-03, Vol.42 (1), p.211-238 |
| issn | 0046-3892 1755-053X |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1319612347 |
| source | EconLit s plnými texty; International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); Business Source Ultimate【Trial: -2024/12/31】【Remote access available】; JSTOR Archival Journals and Primary Sources Collection; Wiley-Blackwell Read & Publish Collection |
| subjects | Analysis Appointments, resignations and dismissals Business structures Capital expenditures Chief executive officers Corporate governance Cost analysis Employee turnover Enterprises Executive dismissals Financial management Hiring Incumbents Industry Marathons Modeling Political succession Proxy statements Studies Succession Succession planning Surprise Tenure Wall Street |
| title | The Effects of Succession Choice Surrounding CEO Turnover Announcements: Evidence from Marathon Successions |
| url | http://sfxeu10.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/loughborough?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-04T12%3A35%3A17IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-gale_proqu&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=The%20Effects%20of%20Succession%20Choice%20Surrounding%20CEO%20Turnover%20Announcements:%20Evidence%20from%20Marathon%20Successions&rft.jtitle=Financial%20management&rft.au=Intintoli,%20Vincent%20J.&rft.date=2013-03-01&rft.volume=42&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=211&rft.epage=238&rft.pages=211-238&rft.issn=0046-3892&rft.eissn=1755-053X&rft_id=info:doi/10.1111/j.1755-053X.2012.01215.x&rft_dat=%3Cgale_proqu%3EA323502205%3C/gale_proqu%3E%3Cgrp_id%3Ecdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c6965-ba82ead9aea065e47d3a25fff54002bf6fa5c4daf9896d8f8e0d18bae329128c3%3C/grp_id%3E%3Coa%3E%3C/oa%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=1346915403&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_galeid=A323502205&rft_jstor_id=43280133&rfr_iscdi=true |