Can Defaults Save the Climate? Evidence from a Field Experiment on Carbon Offsetting Programs

Individual preferences for environmental policies can be influenced by the frame in which choices and decisions are presented. In this paper we present results of a field experiment on the contributions to carbon offsetting programs under two alternative treatments for the default option. The opt-in...

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Published in:Environmental & resource economics 2013-04, Vol.54 (4), p.613-626
Main Authors: Arana, Jorge E, Leon, Carmelo J
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Bias
Carbon
Carbon emissions
Carbon offsets
Climate
Climate change
Consumers
Consumption
Decisions
Default
Economic Policy
Economics
Economics and Finance
Emissions
Emissions control
Environmental Economics
Environmental Law/Policy/Ecojustice
Environmental Management
Environmental policy
Experiments
Frames
Framing
Laboratories
Payments
Policies
Preferences
Proposals
Studies
Willingness to pay
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container_title Environmental & resource economics
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creator Arana, Jorge E
Leon, Carmelo J
description Individual preferences for environmental policies can be influenced by the frame in which choices and decisions are presented. In this paper we present results of a field experiment on the contributions to carbon offsetting programs under two alternative treatments for the default option. The opt-in treatment asked subjects to pay for the policy proposal while the opt-out treatment asked subjects if they wanted to be excluded from payment for the policy proposal. The results show that the frame of the default option had a significant effect on the amount of money paid for the policy proposal. Subjects were more likely to accept the policy proposal if the default option was the opt-out treatment. The results have implications for the design of environmental policies.
doi_str_mv 10.1007/s10640-012-9615-x
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source EconLit s plnými texty; International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); ABI/INFORM global; Springer Nature
subjects Bias
Carbon
Carbon emissions
Carbon offsets
Climate
Climate change
Consumers
Consumption
Decisions
Default
Economic Policy
Economics
Economics and Finance
Emissions
Emissions control
Environmental Economics
Environmental Law/Policy/Ecojustice
Environmental Management
Environmental policy
Experiments
Frames
Framing
Laboratories
Payments
Policies
Preferences
Proposals
Studies
Willingness to pay
title Can Defaults Save the Climate? Evidence from a Field Experiment on Carbon Offsetting Programs
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