A comparative institutional analysis of the Fukushima nuclear disaster: Lessons and policy implications

• Published in: Energy policy 2013-02, Vol.53, p.240-247
• Main Authors: Aoki, Masahiko, Rothwell, Geoffrey
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Accidents; Applied sciences; Comparative analysis; Comparitive institutional analysis; Coordination; Culture; Disasters; Economic data; Electric energy; Electric power; Electric utilities; electricity; Electricity regulation; Energy; Energy economics; energy industry; Energy policy; Energy. Thermal use of fuels; Exact sciences and technology; Fission nuclear power plants; General, economic and professional studies; Industry; Installations for energy generation and conversion: thermal and electrical energy; Islands; issues and policy; Japan; Monopoly; Nuclear accidents & safety; Nuclear energy; Nuclear power; Nuclear power plants; Nuclear safety; Organizational behavior; power plants; Staff. Occupational work. Work management. Control. Safety. Accidents. Professional diseases; Studies
• ISSN: 0301-4215; 1873-6777
• DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2012.10.058

This paper analyzes the causes, responses, and consequences of the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident (March 2011) by comparing these with Three Mile Island (March 1979) and Chernobyl (April 1986). We identify three generic modes of organizational coordination: modular, vertical, and horizontal. By relying on comparative institutional analysis, we compare the modes' performance characteristics in terms of short-term and long-term coordination, preparedness for shocks, and responsiveness to shocks. We derive general lessons, including the identification of three shortcomings of integrated Japanese electric utilities: (1) decision instability that can lead to system failure after a large shock, (2) poor incentives to innovate, and (3) the lack of defense-in-depth strategies for accidents. Our suggested policy response is to introduce an independent Nuclear Safety Commission, and an Independent System Operator to coordinate buyers and sellers on publicly owned transmission grids. Without an independent safety regulator, or a very well established “safety culture,” profit-maximizing behavior by an entrenched electricity monopoly will not necessarily lead to a social optimum with regard to nuclear power plant safety. All countries considering continued operation or expansion of their nuclear power industries must strive to establish independent, competent, and respected safety regulators, or prepare for nuclear power plant accidents. ► We review damage to Fukushima Dai-Ichi on March 11, 2011, from the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami. ► We find that delays in coordinated action led to a cascading series of accidents at Fukushima. ► We suggest unbundling of the publicly purchased Tokyo Electric Power to pay for accident damages. ► We suggest the creation of a Japanese Independent System Operator to manage unbundled transmission assets. ► We propose establishing an open-interface, rule-based independent nuclear regulator in Japan.