Loading…
Sources of disagreement in inflation forecasts: An international empirical investigation
Central to the conduct of monetary policy are inflation forecasts. Inflation forecasts are not unique. Central banks and professional organizations generate inflation forecasts while households are surveyed about their inflation outlook. This paper estimates inflation forecast disagreement for nine...
Saved in:
Published in: | Journal of international economics 2013-05, Vol.90 (1), p.218-231 |
---|---|
Main Author: | |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Citations: | Items that this one cites Items that cite this one |
Online Access: | Get full text |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
Summary: | Central to the conduct of monetary policy are inflation forecasts. Inflation forecasts are not unique. Central banks and professional organizations generate inflation forecasts while households are surveyed about their inflation outlook. This paper estimates inflation forecast disagreement for nine economies over the 1999–2009 period, five of which target inflation. I find that central bank transparency tends to increase forecast disagreement. To the extent this reflects the attention paid to inflation performance the implication is that transparency is beneficial. Moreover, this finding does not appear to be a feature that applies only to central banks that must adhere to an inflation target.
► Understanding why forecast disagreement changes through time is important. ► The focus on varieties of forecasts yields new insights about how expectations are formed. ► There is more work needed on a theory of forecast disagreement. ► Central bank transparency is the single most consistent determinant of forecast disagreement. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 0022-1996 1873-0353 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.jinteco.2012.09.005 |