Committee jurisdiction, congressional behavior and policy outcomes

The literature on congressional committees has largely overlooked the impact of jurisdictional fights on policy proposals and outcomes. This paper develops a theory of how legislators balance the benefits of expanded committee jurisdiction against preferred policy outcomes. It shows why (a) senior m...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Public choice 2013-01, Vol.154 (1/2), p.119-137
Main Author: de Figueiredo, John M.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Commerce
Committees
Congressional committees
Consumer protection
Economic models
Economic theory
Economics
Economics and Finance
Employment
Hypotheses
Incumbents
Intellectual Property
Intellectual property law
Interest groups
Internet
Judicial system
Jurisdiction
Legislation
Legislative Bodies
Legislators
Policy analysis
Political behaviour
Political economy
Political Science
Proposals
Public choice
Public Finance
Studies
Values
War
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Summary:The literature on congressional committees has largely overlooked the impact of jurisdictional fights on policy proposals and outcomes. This paper develops a theory of how legislators balance the benefits of expanded committee jurisdiction against preferred policy outcomes. It shows why (a) senior members, and junior members in safe seats, are most likely to challenge a committee's jurisdiction; (b) policy proposals may be initiated off the proposer's ideal point for jurisdictional gains; (c) policy outcomes will generally be more moderate with jurisdictional fights than without these turf wars. We empirically investigate these results examining proposed Internet intellectual property protection legislation in the 106th Congress.
ISSN:0048-5829
1573-7101
DOI:10.1007/s11127-011-9813-z