Moins de fonctionnaires mais mieux payés ? Un test de l'approche partisane de l'emploi public/Less Public Employees but Better Paid? A Test of the Partisan Model

This article examines the trade-off between the number of public employees and the average salary offered to them, for a given exogenous wage bill. This existence of a partisan platform - a political party that offers few jobs but better paid and another political party which increases the number of...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Revue d'économie politique 2012-11 (6), p.1011
Main Author: Bacache-Beauvallet, Maya
Format: Magazinearticle
Language:fre
Subjects:
Arbitrage
Economic theory
Employees
International comparisons
Political economy
Public sector
Wages & salaries
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Summary:This article examines the trade-off between the number of public employees and the average salary offered to them, for a given exogenous wage bill. This existence of a partisan platform - a political party that offers few jobs but better paid and another political party which increases the number of jobs for a relatively low salary - is tested on 23 countries during the period 1960-2009. Ceteris Paribus, we show that the left (resp. the right) parties significantly increase the number of jobs (resp. the average wage) for a given amount of public expenditure. [PUB ABSTRACT]
ISSN:0373-2630
2105-2883