The distribution of power among EU institutions: who wins under codecision and why?

The codecision procedure was designed to change the distribution of power among the European Union (EU) institutions. In theory, the codecision procedure, at least the amended version introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty that came into effect in 1999, weakened the Commission and placed the Parliament...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of European public policy 2013-08, Vol.20 (7), p.1025-1039
Main Authors: Costello, Rory, Thomson, Robert
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Codecision
Commissions
Council of Ministers
European Parliament
European Union
Institutions
Legislation
legislative bargaining
Legislative Bodies
Negotiation
Parliament
Power
Success
Treaties
Treaty of Amsterdam
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Summary:The codecision procedure was designed to change the distribution of power among the European Union (EU) institutions. In theory, the codecision procedure, at least the amended version introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty that came into effect in 1999, weakened the Commission and placed the Parliament on an equal footing with the Council. We assess how the codecision procedure works in practice using data on the preferences of legislative actors on a large number of proposals negotiated between 1999 and 2009. We also test theoretical propositions derived from Schelling regarding the effects of policy agreement within each chamber on the relative bargaining success of the Council and EP. Our findings suggest that, in comparison to the consultation procedure, codecision has strengthened the EP and weakened the Commission. However, the Council holds certain bargaining advantages over the EP, and as a result the EP has not achieved parity with the Council under codecision.
ISSN:1350-1763
1466-4429
DOI:10.1080/13501763.2013.795393