Implications of game theory for theoretical underpinning of cooperative relations in workplace partnership

This article clarifies the ongoing debate over the key factors underpinning cooperative relations between management and trade unions by drawing on the once‐off and repeated prisoner's dilemma models. It argues that the lower the risk to achieve a ‘win‐win’ outcome and the longer the time horiz...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Industrial relations journal 2013-05, Vol.44 (3), p.258-275
Main Authors: Trif, Aurora, Brady, Malcolm
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Business partnership
Economic relations
Game theory
Labor relations
Labor unions
Labour relations
Management
Partnering
Partnership
Prisoner's dilemma
Risk
Studies
Trade unions
Workplaces
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:This article clarifies the ongoing debate over the key factors underpinning cooperative relations between management and trade unions by drawing on the once‐off and repeated prisoner's dilemma models. It argues that the lower the risk to achieve a ‘win‐win’ outcome and the longer the time horizon for workplace partnership, the more likely is for the two parties to cooperate.
ISSN:0019-8692
1468-2338
DOI:10.1111/irj.12016