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From 'shock and awe' to 'hearts and minds': the fall and rise of US counterinsurgency capability in Iraq

This article recounts the initial difficulties of the US occupation of Iraq that enabled the growth and maturation of the Iraqi insurgency. The focus will be on how the US military adapted, while in combat, to a situation for which its prior training and doctrinal focus had left it ill prepared. The...

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Published in:	Third world quarterly 2007-03, Vol.28 (2), p.217-230
Main Author:	Sepp, Kalev I
Format:	Article
Language:	English
Subjects:	Armies Civil wars Coalitions Cold War Combat Counterinsurgency Decision making Foreign occupation Insurgency Invasion Iraq Iraq War-2003 Military defense Military doctrines Military intervention Military occupations Military operations Military policy Military Strategy Part I: The Long War and the Comparing and Modelling of Insurgency, Counterinsurgency and Collapsing States Rebellions Shock and awe Strategic planning Strategies Terrorism U.S.A United States of America War Warfare
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cited_by	cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c489t-7a6465ec2ed3750b6f7570f26660c9dc4e25fd5daa1c1d3e3bee95703b22173a3
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container_title	Third world quarterly
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creator	Sepp, Kalev I
description	This article recounts the initial difficulties of the US occupation of Iraq that enabled the growth and maturation of the Iraqi insurgency. The focus will be on how the US military adapted, while in combat, to a situation for which its prior training and doctrinal focus had left it ill prepared. The article will explain the challenges faced by military leaders to move from a hierarchical, cold war-designed approach to warfare, to a more adaptive, decentralised mode of operations that requires distributed authority and decision making. The story will be told from the perspective of two strategic planners who helped shape the campaign plan for the coalition forces in Iraq, including the challenges they encountered when attempting to unify all elements of US national power against the Iraqi insurgency.
doi_str_mv	10.1080/01436590601153606
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source	EBSCOhost Business Source Ultimate; International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); JSTOR Archival Journals and Primary Sources Collection; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Sociological Abstracts; Taylor and Francis Social Sciences and Humanities Collection
subjects	Armies Civil wars Coalitions Cold War Combat Counterinsurgency Decision making Foreign occupation Insurgency Invasion Iraq Iraq War-2003 Military defense Military doctrines Military intervention Military occupations Military operations Military policy Military Strategy Part I: The Long War and the Comparing and Modelling of Insurgency, Counterinsurgency and Collapsing States Rebellions Shock and awe Strategic planning Strategies Terrorism U.S.A United States of America War Warfare
title	From 'shock and awe' to 'hearts and minds': the fall and rise of US counterinsurgency capability in Iraq
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