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Revealed objective functions of Microfinance Institutions: Evidence from Bangladesh
This paper discerns between two alternative objective functions for not-for-profit Microfinance Institutions (MFIs): profit maximization and poverty targeting. I use the strategic branch location choices of the two largest MFIs in a mature, concentrated market to reveal their objectives. I consider...
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Published in: | Journal of development economics 2013-09, Vol.104, p.34-55 |
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description | This paper discerns between two alternative objective functions for not-for-profit Microfinance Institutions (MFIs): profit maximization and poverty targeting. I use the strategic branch location choices of the two largest MFIs in a mature, concentrated market to reveal their objectives. I consider location decisions to be the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium outcome of a one-shot game where the MFIs simultaneously choose markets in which to locate as well as how many branches to open in each. Applying the duality principle, I nest fully a pure profit-maximization objective within a poverty targeting motive. I test the model using comprehensive data from Bangladesh in 2003. Structurally estimating profit and impact functions, my MSM estimates suggest that pure profit maximization cannot explain the branch placement pattern for Grameen Bank or BRAC: they both deviate towards poverty alleviation. Targeting one higher standard deviation of poverty headcount costs Grameen 35.2% of its potential profits and BRAC 51.4%. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.03.011 |
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I use the strategic branch location choices of the two largest MFIs in a mature, concentrated market to reveal their objectives. I consider location decisions to be the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium outcome of a one-shot game where the MFIs simultaneously choose markets in which to locate as well as how many branches to open in each. Applying the duality principle, I nest fully a pure profit-maximization objective within a poverty targeting motive. I test the model using comprehensive data from Bangladesh in 2003. Structurally estimating profit and impact functions, my MSM estimates suggest that pure profit maximization cannot explain the branch placement pattern for Grameen Bank or BRAC: they both deviate towards poverty alleviation. 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Targeting one higher standard deviation of poverty headcount costs Grameen 35.2% of its potential profits and BRAC 51.4%.</description><subject>Bangladesh</subject><subject>Estimation</subject><subject>Financial services</subject><subject>Game theory</subject><subject>Institutions</subject><subject>Microfinance</subject><subject>Not-for-profit</subject><subject>Objective functions</subject><subject>Poverty</subject><subject>Poverty alleviation</subject><subject>Profit maximization</subject><subject>Social policy</subject><subject>Standard deviation</subject><subject>Studies</subject><issn>0304-3878</issn><issn>1872-6089</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2013</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>8BJ</sourceid><recordid>eNqFkE1LxDAQhoMouK7-BKHgxUvXyUe3rRfRxS9QBD_OIU0mmtJtNGkX_Pdm3T15EQYSkucdZh5CjinMKND5WTtrDa5Q-xkDymeQitIdMqFVyfI5VPUumQAHkfOqrPbJQYwtAJQcygl5eU5J1aHJfNOiHtwKMzv26eL7mHmbPTodvHW96jVm930c3DD-fp5n1ytncP1sg19mV6p_75TB-HFI9qzqIh5tzyl5u7l-XdzlD0-394vLh1wLLoYc0TKh5zU3psRGFLYwNWMgDEOtGgY1R0oNU8KUrFJCN4VqGl0VgtvENg2fktNN38_gv0aMg1y6qLHrVI9-jJIKQSso6qJK6MkftPVj6NN0iaI18LKsRaKKDZVWjjGglZ_BLVX4lhTkWrVs5Va1XKuWkIrSlLvY5DBtu3IYZNRubca4kJxK490_HX4A65mLCA</recordid><startdate>20130901</startdate><enddate>20130901</enddate><creator>Salim, Mir M.</creator><general>Elsevier B.V</general><general>Elsevier Sequoia S.A</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20130901</creationdate><title>Revealed objective functions of Microfinance Institutions: Evidence from Bangladesh</title><author>Salim, Mir M.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c434t-eef24c693dd7eb45f5d92204d2ecab2093e11d2a4d728a4cb5abbc8543f5f5bb3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2013</creationdate><topic>Bangladesh</topic><topic>Estimation</topic><topic>Financial services</topic><topic>Game theory</topic><topic>Institutions</topic><topic>Microfinance</topic><topic>Not-for-profit</topic><topic>Objective functions</topic><topic>Poverty</topic><topic>Poverty alleviation</topic><topic>Profit maximization</topic><topic>Social policy</topic><topic>Standard deviation</topic><topic>Studies</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Salim, Mir M.</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Journal of development economics</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Salim, Mir M.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Revealed objective functions of Microfinance Institutions: Evidence from Bangladesh</atitle><jtitle>Journal of development economics</jtitle><date>2013-09-01</date><risdate>2013</risdate><volume>104</volume><spage>34</spage><epage>55</epage><pages>34-55</pages><issn>0304-3878</issn><eissn>1872-6089</eissn><coden>JDECDF</coden><abstract>This paper discerns between two alternative objective functions for not-for-profit Microfinance Institutions (MFIs): profit maximization and poverty targeting. 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Targeting one higher standard deviation of poverty headcount costs Grameen 35.2% of its potential profits and BRAC 51.4%.</abstract><cop>Amsterdam</cop><pub>Elsevier B.V</pub><doi>10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.03.011</doi><tpages>22</tpages></addata></record> |
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source | International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); ScienceDirect Journals |
subjects | Bangladesh Estimation Financial services Game theory Institutions Microfinance Not-for-profit Objective functions Poverty Poverty alleviation Profit maximization Social policy Standard deviation Studies |
title | Revealed objective functions of Microfinance Institutions: Evidence from Bangladesh |
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