Pragmatics in Carnap and Morris and the Bipartite Metatheory Conception

This paper concerns the issue of whether the so-called left wing of the Vienna Circle (Carnap, Neurath, Frank) can be understood as having provided the blueprint for a bipartite metatheory with a formal-logical part (the "logic of science") supporting and being supported by a naturalistic-...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Erkenntnis 2013-06, Vol.78 (3), p.523-546
Main Author: Uebel, Thomas
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Education
Empiricism
Epistemology
Ethics
Logic
Logical empiricism
Metatheories
Ontology
Original Paper
Philosophical logics. Philosophy of language
Philosophy
Philosophy of science
Pragmatics
Pragmatism
Semantics
Semiotic signs
Social semiotics
Syntax
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Summary:This paper concerns the issue of whether the so-called left wing of the Vienna Circle (Carnap, Neurath, Frank) can be understood as having provided the blueprint for a bipartite metatheory with a formal-logical part (the "logic of science") supporting and being supported by a naturalistic-empirical part (the "behavioristics of science"). A claim to this effect was recently met by a counterclaim that there was indeed an attempt made to broaden Carnap's formalist conception of philosophy by the pragmatist Morris, but that this initiative failed and that Carnap showed no interest in it. To defend the original claim this paper provides an analysis of Carnap and Morris on the subject matter of pragmatics in order to show that and how Carnap adopted Morris's proposals in so far as they agreed with bipartite metatheory conception.
ISSN:0165-0106
1572-8420
DOI:10.1007/s10670-011-9352-5