The Institutional Collective Action Framework

Institutional collective action (ICA) dilemmas arise from the division or partitioning of authority in which decisions by one government in one or more specific functional area impacts other governments and/or other functions. The focus on externalities of choice in fragmented systems integrates mul...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Policy studies journal 2013-08, Vol.41 (3), p.397-425
Main Author: Feiock, Richard C.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Authority
collaboration
Collective Action
Collectives
Cost
Dilemmas
Empirical research
Governance
Government and politics
Incentives
Jurisdiction
Law enforcement
local governance
Policy making
Policy studies
Public policy
regional governance
Risk
transaction costs
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Summary:Institutional collective action (ICA) dilemmas arise from the division or partitioning of authority in which decisions by one government in one or more specific functional area impacts other governments and/or other functions. The focus on externalities of choice in fragmented systems integrates multiple research traditions into a conceptual system to understand and investigate collective dilemmas ubiquitous in contemporary governance arrangements. The mechanisms for mitigating ICA dilemmas are classified according to their scope and enforcement. Incentives to participate in a mechanism are hypothesized to favor mechanisms that provide the greatest gain for the least cost under different conditions of collaboration risk as determined by the nature of the underlying ICA problem, the compositions of affected jurisdictions, and institutional contexts. After reviewing empirical applications of the framework, an agenda to advance the theoretical and empirical development of the ICA approach is advanced.
ISSN:0190-292X
1541-0072
DOI:10.1111/psj.12023