What do people bring into the game? Experiments in the field about cooperation in the commons

• Published in: Agricultural systems 2004-12, Vol.82 (3), p.307-326
• Main Authors: Cárdenas, Juan-Camilo, Ostrom, Elinor
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Collective action; Cooperation; Experimental economics; Field experiments; Local ecosystems
• ISSN: 0308-521X; 1873-2267
• DOI: 10.1016/j.agsy.2004.07.008

Experimental research has enhanced the knowledge acquired from theoretical and field sources of when and how groups can solve the problem of collective action through self-governing mechanisms. Widespread agreement exists that cooperation can happen, but little agreement as to how. As a first step, we propose that individuals may use three layers of information in deciding about their level of cooperation. The layers range from the material incentives of a specific production function and the dynamics of the game, to the composition of the group and the individual characteristics of the player. We use this framework to analyze data from a set of experiments conducted with actual ecosystem users in three rural villages of Colombia. Prior experience of the participants, their perception of external regulation, and the composition of the group, influence decisions to cooperate or defect in the experiment. Understanding the multiple information levels of a game as they affect incentives helps to explain decisions in collective-action dilemmas.