Community standards

I introduce a model of community standards relevant to the judicial determination of obscenity. Standards are defined as subjective judgments restricted only by a simple reasonableness condition. Individual standards are aggregated to form the community standard. Several axioms reflect legal concern...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of economic theory 2013-11, Vol.148 (6), p.2696-2705
Main Author: Miller, Alan D.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Aggregation
Agreements
Axiomatization
Axioms
Community
Community standards
Decision making models
Doctrinal paradox
Economic theory
Individuals
Judgement
Judgment
Judicial process
Legal aspects
Obscenity
Standardization
Studies
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Summary:I introduce a model of community standards relevant to the judicial determination of obscenity. Standards are defined as subjective judgments restricted only by a simple reasonableness condition. Individual standards are aggregated to form the community standard. Several axioms reflect legal concerns. These require that the community standard (a) preserve unanimous agreements, (b) become more permissive when all individuals become more permissive, and not discriminate, ex ante, (c) between individuals and (d) between works. I show that any rule which satisfies these properties must be “similar” to unanimity rule. I also explore the relationship between the model and the doctrinal paradox of Kornhauser and Sager [12].
ISSN:0022-0531
1095-7235
DOI:10.1016/j.jet.2013.09.008