What Scientists Know Is Not a Function of What Scientists Know

There are two senses of ‘what scientists know’: An individual sense (the separate opinions of individual scientists) and a collective sense (the state of the discipline). The latter is what matters for policy and planning, but it is not something that can be directly observed or reported. A function...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Philosophy of science 2013-12, Vol.80 (5), p.840-849
Main Author: Magnus, P. D.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Aggregation
Communities
Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge
Factual judgments
Inference
Judgement
Judgment
Judgments
Knowledge
Majority rule
Moral judgment
Opinion
Opinions
Philosophy
Philosophy of science
Planning
Planning methods
Policy and planning
Polls
Scientific ethics
Scientists
Social theory
Value judgments
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Summary:There are two senses of ‘what scientists know’: An individual sense (the separate opinions of individual scientists) and a collective sense (the state of the discipline). The latter is what matters for policy and planning, but it is not something that can be directly observed or reported. A function can be defined to map individual judgments onto an aggregate judgment. I argue that such a function cannot effectively capture community opinion, especially in cases that matter to us.
ISSN:0031-8248
1539-767X
DOI:10.1086/673718