Strategy-proof preference aggregation: Possibilities and characterizations

An aggregation rule maps each profile of individual strict preference orderings over a set of alternatives into a social ordering over that set. We call such a rule strategy-proof if misreporting one's preference never produces a different social ordering that is between the original ordering a...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Games and economic behavior 2014-05, Vol.85, p.109-126
Main Authors: Bossert, Walter, Sprumont, Yves
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Decision making models
Economic analysis
Economic behaviour
Games
Management science
Population monotonicity
Preference aggregation
Preferences
Proof theory
Social order
Strategy-proofness
Studies
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:An aggregation rule maps each profile of individual strict preference orderings over a set of alternatives into a social ordering over that set. We call such a rule strategy-proof if misreporting one's preference never produces a different social ordering that is between the original ordering and one's own preference. After describing two examples of manipulable rules, we study in some detail three classes of strategy-proof rules: (i) rules based on a monotonic alteration of the majority relation generated by the preference profile; (ii) rules improving upon a fixed status-quo; and (iii) rules generalizing the Condorcet–Kemeny aggregation method. •We propose a definition of strategyproofness applicable to preference aggregation rules.•We discuss examples of manipulable rules.•We study three classes of strategy-proof aggregation rules.
ISSN:0899-8256
1090-2473
DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.015