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Markov perfect Nash equilibria in models with a single capital stock

Many economic problems can be formulated as dynamic games in which strategically interacting agents choose actions that determine the current and future levels of a single capital stock. We study necessary as well as sufficient conditions that allow us to characterise Markov perfect Nash equilibria...

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Published in:	Economic theory 2014-08, Vol.56 (3), p.585-625
Main Authors:	Dockner, Engelbert, Wagener, Florian
Format:	Article
Language:	English
Subjects:	Analysis Capital stock Capital stocks Consumption Consumption functions Differential games Economic status Economic systems Economic theory Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Equilibrium Game Theory Games Hamilton Jacobi equation Investment Markov models Markov processes Markovian processes Microeconomics Nash equilibrium Ordinary differential equations Partial differential equations Public Finance Representative agent Research Article Shadow prices Social and Behav. Sciences Studies Trajectories Variables Viscosity
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container_title	Economic theory
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creator	Dockner, Engelbert Wagener, Florian
description	Many economic problems can be formulated as dynamic games in which strategically interacting agents choose actions that determine the current and future levels of a single capital stock. We study necessary as well as sufficient conditions that allow us to characterise Markov perfect Nash equilibria for these games. These conditions can be translated into an auxiliary system of ordinary differential equations that helps us to explore stability, continuity and differentiability of these equilibria. The techniques are used to derive detailed properties of Markov perfect Nash equilibria for several games including voluntary investment in a public capital stock, the intertemporal consumption of a reproductive asset and the pollution of a shallow lake.
doi_str_mv	10.1007/s00199-014-0805-3
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source	EconLit s plnými texty; EBSCOhost Business Source Ultimate; International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); JSTOR Archival Journals and Primary Sources Collection; ABI/INFORM Global; Springer Nature
subjects	Analysis Capital stock Capital stocks Consumption Consumption functions Differential games Economic status Economic systems Economic theory Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Equilibrium Game Theory Games Hamilton Jacobi equation Investment Markov models Markov processes Markovian processes Microeconomics Nash equilibrium Ordinary differential equations Partial differential equations Public Finance Representative agent Research Article Shadow prices Social and Behav. Sciences Studies Trajectories Variables Viscosity
title	Markov perfect Nash equilibria in models with a single capital stock
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