Asset specificity and complementarity and MNE ownership strategies: The role of institutional distances

This study integrates transaction cost economics and institutional theory to propose a contingency model of multinational enterprises' design of ownership control. We posit that asset specificity and complementarity influence the design of ownership control, which is further affected by the ins...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Industrial marketing management 2014-07, Vol.43 (5), p.777-785
Main Authors: Zhang, Yuanyuan, Zhong, Weiguo, Wen, Na, Jiang, Dequan
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Asset complementarity
Asset specificity
Control
Economic theory
Multinational corporations
Multinational enterprises
Normative distance
Organization theory
Organizational behaviour
Ownership strategies
Regulation
Regulatory distance
Stockholders
Studies
Transaction costs
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Summary:This study integrates transaction cost economics and institutional theory to propose a contingency model of multinational enterprises' design of ownership control. We posit that asset specificity and complementarity influence the design of ownership control, which is further affected by the institutional environment. Furthermore, we argue that regulatory distance and normative distance display differentiating moderations on the main effects. Regulatory distance strengthens the positive effect of asset specificity on ownership control while normative distance enhances the negative effect of asset complementarity on ownership control.
ISSN:0019-8501
1873-2062
DOI:10.1016/j.indmarman.2014.04.005