A study on risk retention regulation in asset securitization process

• Published in: Journal of banking & finance 2014-08, Vol.45, p.61-71
• Main Authors: Guo, Guixia, Wu, Ho-Mou
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Adverse selection; Asset securitization; Asymmetric information; Credit risk; Disclosure; Dynamic models; Effectiveness studies; Information disclosure regulation; Investors; Regulation; Risk aversion; Risk management; Risk retention; Risk retention regulation; Securities regulations; Securitization; Social welfare
• ISSN: 0378-4266; 1872-6372
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.12.027

We study the impacts of the recently proposed risk retention regulation for asset securitization, i.e. the issuer has to retain a certain proportion of securitized assets. We also consider the frequently discussed measure to require the issuer disclose certain information of the securitized assets. In a dynamic model with asymmetric information between a risk-averse originating bank and a continuum of risk-averse investors, we find that it is impossible for a flat-rate retention requirement to be optimal for all asset types. Although both risk retention and information disclosure regulations are effective in reducing investors’ informational loss, neither can unconditionally enhance social welfare upon the unregulated case. For both measures, there are associated regulatory cost: risk retention regulation aggravates adverse selection problem because it undermines the channel of informational revelation by the choice of securitization intensity, and information disclosure requirement incurs a signalling cost by distorting banks’ securitization intensity in sending signals. Under an appropriate set of conditions we find that information disclosure requirement complements risk retention regulation when investors are sufficiently risk averse.