Intelligence and bribing behavior in a one-shot game

► We investigate the relationship between intelligence and corruption in a simple game of bribery. ► We find a robust negative relationship between intelligence and bribing behavior. ► We find that gender perceptions of corruption are important determinants in the willingness to bribe. ► Contrary to...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Journal of socio-economics 2013-06, Vol.44, p.91-96
Main Authors: Shaw, Philip, Vásquez, William F., LeClair, Mark
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Attitudes
Bribery
Corruption
Game theory
Gender
Intelligence
Probability
Sex
Studies
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Summary:► We investigate the relationship between intelligence and corruption in a simple game of bribery. ► We find a robust negative relationship between intelligence and bribing behavior. ► We find that gender perceptions of corruption are important determinants in the willingness to bribe. ► Contrary to other papers, we find no absolute gender effect after controlling for perceptions. We investigate the relationship between intelligence and bribing behavior in a simple one-shot game of corruption. We find a robust relationship between intelligence and the probability of bribing in which a higher intelligence quotient (IQ) leads to a lower probability of bribing in the game. This result holds after controlling for other determinants such as gender, attitude toward corruption, and perceptions of corruption. By revealing the gender of the matched player, we also show that gender perceptions of corruption are strong determinants of bribery.
ISSN:1053-5357
2214-8043
1879-1239
2214-8051
DOI:10.1016/j.socec.2013.02.013