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Tax effects in a two-region model of monopolistic competition

I examine how unit tax and ad valorem tax affect firm location in a monopolistic‐competition model with asymmetrically sized regions and a quasi‐linear preference. Tax revenue is evenly distributed to all workers or evenly distributed to the workers residing in the region generating the tax revenue....

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Published in:Papers in regional science 2014-08, Vol.93 (3), p.595-617
Main Author: Takatsuka, Hajime
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Language:English
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description I examine how unit tax and ad valorem tax affect firm location in a monopolistic‐competition model with asymmetrically sized regions and a quasi‐linear preference. Tax revenue is evenly distributed to all workers or evenly distributed to the workers residing in the region generating the tax revenue. When a homogeneous good is traded, despite reimbursement systems, the ad valorem tax retains the firm share, while the unit tax accelerates firm agglomeration in the larger region. When the homogeneous good is nontradable, despite taxation schemes, the intraregional distribution retains the firm share, while the interregional one accelerates agglomeration in the larger region. Resumen Se examina cómo el impuesto específico y el impuesto ad valorem afectan a la localización de empresas en un modelo de competencia‐monopolio con regiones de tamaño asimétrico y una preferencia cuasi‐lineal. Los ingresos tributarios se distribuyen de manera uniforme para todos los trabajadores o se distribuyen uniformemente a los trabajadores que residen en la región que genera la recaudación tributaria. En las transacciones de un bien homogéneo, a pesar de los sistemas de reembolso, el impuesto ad valorem conserva la proporción de la empresa, mientras que el impuesto específico acelera la aglomeración de empresas en la región más grande. Cuando el bien homogéneo no es objeto de transacciones, a pesar de los regímenes fiscales, la distribución intrarregional conserva la proporción de la empresa, mientras que la interregional acelera la aglomeración en la región más grande.
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source EconLit s plnými texty; EBSCOhost Business Source Ultimate; International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); ScienceDirect Journals
subjects ad valorem tax
Ad valorem taxes
Agglomeration
Asia
Bgi / Prodig
Distribution
firm location
Human geography
Industrial concentration
Japan
Location of industry
Monopolistic competition
Studies
Tax revenue
Tax revenues
Taxation
Taxation economics
Unit tax
title Tax effects in a two-region model of monopolistic competition
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