Reputation and Cooperation in Defense

Surprisingly high levels of within-group cooperation are observed in conflict situations. Experiemnts confirm that external threats lead to higher cooperation. The psychological literature suggests proximate explanations in the form of group processes, but does not explain how these processes can ev...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Journal of conflict resolution 2013-04, Vol.57 (2), p.327-355
Main Authors: Hugh-Jones, David, Zultan, Ro'i
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Altruism
Biological altruism
Conflict
Conflict resolution
Cooperation
Defense
Ecological competition
Experiments
Generals
Group behaviour
Group dynamics
Group incentives
Group membership
Observational research
Organizational behavior
Prisoners dilemma
Public Goods
Repeated games
Reputation
Reputations
Riots
Signalling
Social cooperation
Social psychology
Studies
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Summary:Surprisingly high levels of within-group cooperation are observed in conflict situations. Experiemnts confirm that external threats lead to higher cooperation. The psychological literature suggests proximate explanations in the form of group processes, but does not explain how these processes can evolve and persist. The authors provide an ultimate explanation, in which cooperation is a rational response to an external threat. In the model, groups vary in their willingness to help each other against external attackers. Attackers infer cooperativeness of groups from members' behavior under attack and may be deterred by a group that bands together against an initial attack. Then, even self-interested individuals may defend each other when threatened in order to deter future attacks. A group's reputation is a public good with a natural weakest-link structure. The model extends to cooperative and altruistic behavior in general.
ISSN:0022-0027
1552-8766
DOI:10.1177/0022002712445745